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SILENCING THE VICTIMS  
IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE PROSECUTIONS: 
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE AND CHILDREN’S 
HEARSAY STATEMENTS BEFORE AND AFTER 




I. INTRODUCTION   
Child sexual abuse prosecutions present challenging eviden-
tiary and constitutional issues.  Oftentimes, there is no physical evi-
dence of the abuse.  Children will frequently recant their allegations, 
since the vast majority of these crimes are committed by a parent, 
other relative, or by a friend of the family.1  The child is often the  
only witness to the crime because these crimes take place in secret.2  
Furthermore, the young child witness may be incapable of under-
standing the nature of the crime, the significance of his or her testi-
mony, or be too frightened or anxious to testify.3  The problem is 
compounded when courts find young children incompetent to testify 
on the grounds that they are unable to distinguish the truth from lies4 
 
* Deborah Paruch is an associate professor of law at the University of Detroit Mercy 
School of Law.  The author would like to thank her research assistant, Grace Trueman, for 
all of her help with this article. 
1 See Kamala London et al., Disclosure of Child Sexual Abuse: What Does the Research 
Tell Us About the Ways That Children Tell?, 11 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL‘Y & L. 194, 195, 216-17 
(2005) (discussing numerous scientific studies showing a wide range of recantation by al-
leged child sexual abuse victims); Myrna Raeder, Crawford and Beyond: Exploring the Fu-
ture of the Confrontation Clause in Light of Its Past: Remember the Ladies and the Children 
Too: Crawford‘s Impact on Domestic Violence and Child Abuse Cases, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 
311, 374-75 (2005). 
2 Raeder, supra note 1. 
3 Brian Fox, Crawford at Its Limits: Hearsay and Forfeiture in Child Abuse Cases, 46 
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1245, 1245 (2009). 
4 Victoria Talwar et al., Children’s Conceptual Knowledge of Lying and Its Relation to 
Their Actual Behaviors: Implications for Court Competence Examinations, 26 LAW & HUM. 
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or because they are unable to communicate in a traditional courtroom 
setting.5  As a result of these factors, prosecutors rely heavily on the 
use of hearsay in child abuse prosecutions, with children‘s statements 
primarily presented as excited utterances, statements made in connec-
tion with medical diagnosis and treatment, or through the catchall or 
residual exceptions to the hearsay rule.6 
It is often difficult to separate emotion from reason in these 
cases given the nature of the crime.  Moreover, because of the highly 
charged emotions these crimes bring out, it can be easy to overlook 
the devastating effect that false accusations of this nature have on the 
accused.  Marriages and careers have been destroyed and reputations 
ruined as the result of false accusations of sexual abuse.7  But it is 
precisely because of the highly emotional nature of these offenses 
that courts must proceed with caution to assure that the proper bal-
ance is maintained between the competing interests at stake: the need 
 
BEHAV. 395, 396 (2002). 
5 Raeder, supra note 1, at 376. 
6 Myrna S. Raeder, Comments on Child Abuse Litigation in a “Testimonial” World: The 
Intersection of Competency, Hearsay, and Confrontation, 82 IND. L.J. 1009, 1009 (2007). 
7 Robert G. Marks, Should We Believe the People Who Believe the Children?: The Need 
for a New Sexual Abuse Tender Years Hearsay Exception Statute, 32 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 
207, 208-09 & n.7 (1995) (citing RICHARD A. GARDNER, TRUE AND FALSE ACCUSATIONS OF 
CHILD SEX ABUSE xxvii (1992)).  Prosecutors continue to pursue cases even though they 
have insufficient evidence.  Id. at 210-11 & nn.15-17 (providing instances of prosecutorial 
excess).  A recent case in Michigan illustrates what can happen in an overzealous quest to 
prosecute allegations of sexual abuse.  Julian and Thal Wendrow were charged in late 2007 
with sexual abuse after their 14-year-old autistic and mute daughter alleged through facili-
tated communication (FC) that her father had sexually abused her.  Brian Dickerson, Op-Ed., 
How Judicial Cowardice Prolonged a Travesty, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 19, 2011, at A23.  
The facilitated communication in this case involved a school aide who guided the girl‘s hand 
on a keyboard.  Id.  The aide reported the allegations to school authorities, which in turn con-
tacted the police.  L.L. Brasier & John Wisely, A Family’s Nightmare, DETROIT FREE PRESS, 
June 12, 2011, at A1.  The parents were arrested and their daughter and son were placed in 
foster care.  Id.  Thal Wendrow was ultimately released on house arrest, however, Julian was 
imprisoned for nearly three months.  Dickerson, supra.  Although there was no evidence to 
indicate that FC was anything but junk science, the police and prosecutors continued their 
case against the parents.  Id.  Their attempts to communicate with the young girl without FC 
were unsuccessful.  Id.  The prosecutors and police also aggressively questioned the Wen-
drows‘ son and dismissed a nurse‘s evaluation that tended to exonerate the Wendrows.  
Brasier & Wisely, supra.  They also attempted to communicate with the girl using FC even 
after a court barred them from doing so.  Id.  Four months after the case began, the prosecu-
tion was forced to dismiss the case for lack of evidence.  Id.  All in all, the Wendrow family 
was separated for 106 days.  Id.  Julian and Thal lost their jobs and believe they will always 
be viewed with suspicion.  Id.  They ultimately filed a federal lawsuit against police, the 
prosecutors, and the school district.  L.L. Brasier, Parents Target Prosecutors, School, Po-
lice, DETROIT FREE PRESS, June 17, 2011, at A7.  They recently settled their claims against 
the police department for $1.8 million.  Id. 
2
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to protect the vulnerable victims of these dreadful crimes and safe-
guarding a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation.8 
Under the standard enunciated in Ohio v. Roberts,9 courts 
were free to admit hearsay statements without fear of violating the 
Confrontation Clause so long as the court found that the statements 
bore an ―adequate indicia of reliability.‖10  Additionally, the state-
ments were presumed to be reliable if they fit within a firmly estab-
lished exception to the hearsay rule.11  The Supreme Court‘s 2004 
decision in Crawford v. Washington12 overruled Roberts and shifted 
the focus from the reliability of the hearsay statements to an examina-
tion of the nature of the statements themselves, requiring courts to de-
termine if the statement fit within the Court‘s loosely defined defini-
tion of a ―testimonial‖ statement.13  The Court held that a statement 
would be testimonial if it was made ― ‗under circumstances which 
would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe that the state-
ment would be available for use at a later trial.‘ ‖14  The Court further 
held that if a hearsay statement is found to be testimonial, it cannot be 
admitted in a criminal trial unless the declarant is unavailable and the 
defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination.15 
In the seven years since the Crawford decision, the Court has 
issued two other decisions on this matter.  Davis v. Washington16 was 
decided in 2006.  In Davis, the Court further developed its definition 
of testimonial statements, holding that statements made to police dur-
ing an ―ongoing emergency‖ were not testimonial because the prima-
ry purpose of the interrogation was to enable the police to respond to 
the situation at hand, rather than produce evidence for use at a subse-
quent trial.17 
In February 2011, the Court handed down its decision in 
 
8 See Marks, supra note 7, at 214-18 (discussing conflicting issues of need for hearsay in 
sexual abuse cases and the possible infringements to a defendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to 
confrontation). 
9 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004). 
10 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 42 (citing Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). 
11 Id. 
12 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
13 Id. at 68-69. 
14 Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for Nat‘l Ass‘n Criminal Def. Lawyers et al. -as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410) at *3). 
15 Id. at 68-69. 
16 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
17 Id. at 822. 
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Michigan v. Bryant.18  In Bryant, the Court further developed the 
―ongoing emergency‖ rule it established in Davis, and in doing so, 
suggested that the duration of an emergency in domestic violence 
cases will typically be much shorter than in other types of crimes.19  
Although the Court affirmed the requirement that courts should apply 
an objective standard in determining ― ‗the primary purpose of the in-
terrogation,‘ ‖ the Court shifted the focus of the inquiry from the dec-
larant to the interrogator, particularly in situations where a declarant 
is operating under a disability.20  Finally, the Court reintroduced the 
concept of reliability into its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, al-
though it provided no guidance as to how this concept should be ap-
plied, nor did it explain how the reliability of a hearsay statement 
could be relevant to the determination of whether a statement is tes-
timonial.21 
This article examines the changes to Confrontation Clause   
jurisprudence brought about by the Bryant decision, particularly as it 
relates to children‘s hearsay statements in criminal sexual abuse tri-
als, and argues that the effect of this decision will be to further re-
strict the admission of these statements in cases where the children do 
not testify.  Part II of this article briefly sets forth the history of the 
Confrontation Clause and includes a discussion of the admissibility 
of children‘s hearsay statements during the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries.  Part III reviews the Supreme Court‘s decisions in 
 
18 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
19 Id. at 1156. 
20 Id. at 1156, 1161-62 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
21 Id. at 1174-75 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Another line of cases decided by the Supreme 
Court dealing with Confrontation Clause challenges to the admissibility of hearsay involve 
reports containing forensic analysis of certain seized substances.  In the first case, Melendez-
Diaz v. Massachusetts, the Court held that an analyst‘s sworn affidavit, setting forth the re-
sults of a forensic analysis and reporting that the substance tested was found to be cocaine, 
was a testimonial statement and inadmissible in the absence of a showing that the analyst 
was unavailable to testify at trial and that the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.  Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527, 2532 (2009).  In Bullcom-
ing v. New Mexico, the Court held that the admission of a laboratory report containing a fo-
rensic analysis of the defendant‘s blood sample through the in court testimony of a scientist 
employed by the laboratory, but who neither observed nor performed the test, violated the 
Confrontation Clause.  Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705 (2011).  At the time of 
this writing, the Court is deciding Williams v. Illinois, which raises the question of whether 
the Confrontation Clause is violated where a prosecution expert in a criminal case relies on a 
testimonial lab report in forming his opinion, the report is disclosed to the jury under Fed. R. 
Evid. 703, and the author of the report fails to appear as a witness at the trial.  People v. Wil-
liams, 939 N.E.2d 268, 274 (Ill. 2010), cert. granted, 131 S. Ct. 3090 (2011). 
4
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Ohio v. Roberts,22 Crawford v. Washington,23 Davis v. Washington,24 
and Michigan v. Bryant.25  Part IV examines state and federal cases 
that involved children‘s hearsay statements in sexual abuse prosecu-
tions.  It illustrates how courts resolved questions related to child-
ren‘s hearsay under Roberts and how Crawford and Davis altered the 
resolution of these issues.  Part V analyzes the Bryant decision and 
demonstrates how this decision will likely serve to further restrict the 
admissibility of children‘s hearsay statements in sexual abuse prose-
cutions.  The article concludes with recommendations that courts can 
employ to increase the likelihood that children will testify at trial.  It 
also recommends that prosecutors utilize pre-trial depositions when 
feasible to do so, as these can preserve a defendant‘s Confrontation 
Clause rights by providing the defendant with an opportunity for 
cross-examination of the child witness before the actual trial, there-
fore assuring that the child‘s testimonial statements will be admitted 
at trial. 
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE CONFRONTATION 
CLAUSE 
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution provides: ―In all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him . . . .‖26  The right of confrontation serves two purposes, 
which have been described as follows: 
        The main and essential purpose of confrontation 
is to secure for the opponent the opportunity of cross-
 
22 448 U.S. 56 (1980), overruled by Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. 
23 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
24 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
25 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
26 U.S. CONST. amend VI.  The Amendment was proposed to Congress in 1789 and 
adopted in 1791.  H. JOURNAL, 1st Cong., 1st Sess. 85-88 (1789), available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/hlaw:@field(DOCID+@lit(hj001139)) (in-
troducing the Bill of Rights Amendments); see Ratification of Constitutional Amendments, 
U.S. CONST. ONLINE, http://www.usconstitution.net/constamrat.html (last modified Nov. 11, 
2010) (stating the dates that states ratified the Bill of Rights; Virginia was the eleventh state 
to ratify on December 15, 1791 providing the required majority of eleven out of fourteen 
states).  The Confrontation Clause is made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.  See Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 
(1965) (holding that the right of confrontation is a fundamental right made applicable to the 
states through the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution). 
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examination.  The opponent demands confrontation, 
not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or 
of being gazed upon by him, but for the purpose of 
cross-examination, which cannot be had except by di-
rect and personal putting of questions and obtaining 
immediate answers. 
. . . . 
        There is, however, a secondary advantage to be 
obtained by the personal appearance of the witness; 
the judge and the jury are enabled to obtain the elusive 
and incommunicable evidence of a witness’ deport-
ment while testifying, and a certain subjective moral 
effect is produced upon the witness.27 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that the 
right to not be confronted with hearsay is a corollary to the right of 
cross-examination.28  Hearsay presents two distinct legal issues: 
whether the out-of-court statements are admissible under the estab-
lished evidentiary rules and whether the admissibility of the hearsay 
statements in a criminal proceeding violates the Confrontation Clause 
of the Sixth Amendment.  In California v. Green,29 the Court noted: 
[W]e have more than once found a violation of con-
frontation values even though the statements in issue 
were admitted under an arguable recognized hearsay 
exception.  The converse is equally true: merely be-
cause evidence is admitted in violation of a long-
established hearsay rule does not lead to the automatic 
conclusion that confrontation rights have been de-
nied.30 
The Confrontation Clause has its origins in Roman law and 
the common law of England.31  Many discussions of the history of the 
 
27 3 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE 
IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW: INCLUDING THE STATUTES AND JUDICIAL DECISIONS OF ALL 
JURISDICTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA § 1395, at 94, 96 (2d ed. 1923). 
28 See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 155-56 (1970) (explaining that while there is 
overlap between the Confrontation Clause and hearsay prohibitions, there is no complete 
congruence). 
29 399 U.S. 149 (1970). 
30 Id. at 155-56 (internal citations omitted). 
31 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 43. 
6
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Confrontation Clause begin by noting that history provides scant 
guidance in interpreting it.32  Justice Harlan, concurring in Green, 
noted: ―As the Court‘s opinion suggests, the Confrontation Clause 
comes to us on faded parchment.  History seems to give us very little 
insight into the intended scope of the Sixth Amendment Confronta-
tion Clause.‖33 
In the common law of England, the development of the hear-
say rule, as a ―distinct and living idea,‖ did not begin until the       
sixteenth century and did not reach full development until the early 
eighteenth century.34  The process of obtaining information from per-
sons who were not called as witnesses during the trial was a common 
practice in trials in England during the fifteenth century.35  In fact, it 
was a standard practice for jurors to confer privately with witnesses 
outside of court, where the witnesses would ―inform‖ the juror.36  
This practice was described by Chief Justice Fortescue in 1450, ― ‗If 
the jurors come to a man where he lives, in the country, to have 
knowledge of the truth of the matter, and he informs them, it is justi-
fiable.‘ ‖37  In those days, jurors also may have been provided with a 
―counsel‘s report,‖ which documented what a witness might have 
said or predicted what the witness would likely say about the matter 
before the court.38  During this time, there was little to no objection to 
the use of these types of out-of-court statements at trial.39 
During the seventeenth century, juries came to depend, with 
increased frequency, on in-court testimony as the chief source of their 
information.40  At this time, a sense of impropriety arose surrounding 
the use of out-of-court statements, based principally on the notion 
that when these types of statements are used as evidence, they should 
 
32 See, e.g., White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 361-62 (1992) (Thomas, J., concurring) (dis-
cussing the history of the development of the Confrontation Clause).  ―From the scant infor-
mation available it may tentatively be concluded that the Confrontation Clause was meant to 
constitutionalize a barrier against flagrant abuses, trials by anonymous accusers, and absen-
tee witnesses.‖  Green, 399 U.S. at 179 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
33 Green, 399 U.S. at 173-74. 
34 John H. Wigmore, The History of the Hearsay Rule, 17 HARV. L. REV. 437, 437 (1904). 
35 Id. at 438-39. 
36 Id. at 440. 
37 Id. (quoting Chief Justice Fortescue). 
38 Id. at 441. 
39 Wigmore, supra note 34, at 440.  Actually, the process of producing fact witnesses at 
trial was discouraged.  Id. at 440-41.  Compulsory process for witnesses was not provided 
until 1562-1563.  Id. at 440. 
40 Id. at 441. 
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be admitted only if the person affected by them had an opportunity to 
test their trustworthiness by means of cross-examination.41  It was al-
so during this period of time that considerable thought was being giv-
en to the quantity and the reliability of the evidence that would allow 
jurors to reach a correct decision.  Statutes and other rules were 
passed that addressed topics such as ―good and sufficient‖ or ―good 
and lawful‖ proofs.42  It was as a result of these transformations that 
courts began to question ―whether a hearsay [sic] thus laid before [a 
jury] would suffice‖43 and courts began to challenge the validity of 
verdicts where the evidence presented at trial consisted solely of 
hearsay.44 
Many accounts of the history of the Confrontation Clause cite 
the infamous prosecution of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason in 1603.45  
Raleigh was charged with conspiring against King James by raising 
money abroad to distribute to rebels with the objective of having 
Arabella Stuart placed on the throne.46  The most damaging evidence 
presented by the prosecution was statements that Lord Cobham had 
given during an interrogation conducted in the Tower of London.47  
Cobham had allegedly stated that Raleigh was the instigator of the 
plan to overthrow the King.  During the trial, records of this interro-
gation along with a letter written by Cobham were read to the jury.48  
Raleigh denied the charges, presented evidence that Cobham had re-
canted his statements, and demanded that the court call Cobham to 
appear at trial.49  Raleigh argued, ― ‗[T]he Proof of the Common Law 
is by witness and jury: let Cobham be here, let him speak it.  Call my 
accuser before my face.‘ ‖50  However, his request was denied.51  It is 
 
41 Id. at 448. 
42 Wigmore, supra note 34, at 441-42. 
43 Id. at 442. 
44 Id. at 442-43.  For example, a discussion was raised whether the requirement for a con-
viction for treason, which required evidence from two accusers, could be satisfied if one was 
by hearsay.  Id.  ―[I]t was there holden for law, that of two accusers, if one be an accuser of 
his own knowledge, or of his own hearing, and he relate it to another, the other may well be 
an accuser.‖  Thomas‘s Case, 73 Eng. Rep. 218, 218-19 (1553). 
45 See, e.g., Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
46 Daniel H. Pollitt, The Right of Confrontation: Its History and Modern Dress, 8 J. PUB. 
L. 381, 388 (1951). 
47 Id.; Jacqueline Forsgren Cronkhite, Signed, Sealed, Delivered . . . Unconstitutional: The 
Effect of Melendez-Diaz on the Use of Notarized Crime Laboratory Reports in Arkansas, 63 
ARK. L. REV. 757, 761 (2010). 
48 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. (quoting Trial of Sir Walter Raleigh, (1603) 1 James I. 15-16, available in 2 T.B. 
8
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reported that one of the judges responding to Raleigh‘s request stated: 
― ‗[M]any horse-stealers may escape, if they may not be condemned 
without witnesses.‘ ‖52  Raleigh was convicted and sentenced to 
death.53 
It was during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries 
that courts began to question the practice of freely admitting hear-
say.54  However, at this time, the law distinguished hearsay state-
ments made under oath from those that were not.55  It was common 
practice to have a sworn statement read aloud to the jury and for the 
deponent to confirm it by indicating that it was freely and voluntarily 
made.56  By the end of the seventeenth century, this practice of admit-
ting sworn extrajudicial statements was abandoned in favor of one 
that required the testimony of the witness in court.57 
In fact, two trials decided in 1696, The King v. Paine58 and 
Fenwick’s Trial,59 appear to have solidified the rule that hearsay 
statements, including those given under oath, should not be admitted 
if there was no prior opportunity for cross-examination.  In Paine, the 
declarant had given a deposition under oath in front of the Mayor of 
Bristol but died before the trial.60  The King‘s Bench remarked, 
―[T]hese depositions should not be given in evidence, the defendant 
not being present when they were taken before the mayor, and so had 
lost the benefit of a cross-examination.‖61 
By the beginning of the eighteenth century, the hearsay rule 
had become settled doctrine and prohibited out-of-court statements 
from being used as evidence at trial unless the opponent was pro-
 
HOWELL, A COMPLETE COLLECTION OF STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON 
AND OTHER CRIMES AND MISDEMEANORS 15-16 (1816), available at 
http://books.google.com/books?id=9AxAAAAAYAAJ&dq=Let%20Cobhan%20be%20here
%20let%20him%20speak%20it&pg=PT19#v=onepage&q&f=false (last visited Oct. 11, 
2011)). 
51 Id. 
52 Miller v. Indiana, 517 N.E.2d 64, 67 (Ind. 1987) (quoting K. Graham, The Right of 
Confrontation and the Hearsay Rule: Sir Walter Raleigh Loses Another One, 8 CRIM. L. 
BULL. 99, 100 (1972)). 
53 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
54 Wigmore, supra note 34, at 441-43. 
55 Id. at 445-46, 448, 451. 
56 Id. at 448, 451. 
57 Id. at 451-56. 
58 The King v. Paine, (1700) 87 Eng. Rep. 584 (K.B.). 
59 Fenwick‘s Trial, (1696) 13 How. St. Tr. 537, 591-93 (Eng.). 
60 Paine, 87 Eng. Rep. at 584. 
61 Id. at 585. 
9
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vided with an opportunity for cross-examination.62  This prohibition 
applied to both sworn and unsworn statements.63 
Children‘s hearsay statements were treated differently from 
those of adults during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries.  
The law generally allowed children‘s hearsay statements in criminal 
trials in the absence of their sworn testimony on the grounds of ne-
cessity; the statements were the best evidence available in the ab-
sence of live testimony.64  Furthermore, courts routinely admitted 
children‘s statements that were made before magistrates whose func-
tion was to determine if an arrest warrant should be issued or whether 
the defendant should be detained and held over for trial.65 
It was also during this period of time that judges were begin-
ning to understand the necessity of abolishing the presumption of a 
child witness‘ incompetence.  The decision in The King v. Brasier66 is 
an example of a case involving hearsay statements of a young child in 
 
62 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1364, at 27 (Little, 
Brown and Company rev. ed. 1974). 
63 Id. (quoting Lent v. Shear, 55 N.E. 2, 4 (N.Y. 1899)).  One author has summed it up as 
follows: ―Such . . . seems to have been the course of development of that most characteristic 
rule of the Anglo-American law of evidence – a rule which may be esteemed, next to jury 
trial, the greatest contribution of that eminently practical legal system to the world‘s methods 
of procedure.‖  Id. at 28. 
64 Thomas D. Lyon & Raymond LaMagna, The History of Children’s Hearsay: From Old 
Bailey to Post-Davis, 82 IND. L.J. 1029, 1036 (2007). 
65 Id. at 1045. 
66 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779).  Several different versions of the opinion in this case have 
been published.  Robert P. Mosteller, Testing the Testimonial Concept and Exceptions to 
Confrontation: “A Little Child Shall Lead Them,” 82 IND. L.J. 917, 923-31 (2007).  The var-
ious reported opinions differ with respect to whether the child‘s mother testified at the trial 
and whether she should have been allowed to testify as to her child‘s statements.  Id. at 926, 
928.  One published version indicates that the mother did testify at the trial.  Id. at 926.  It 
reported that the ―Judges determined, therefore, that the evidence of the information which 
the infant had given to her mother . . . ought not to have been received.‖  Id. at 926 (citing 
Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202).  Another version of the case published in 1789 makes no refer-
ence to the child‘s mother or her testimony.  Id. at 928.  This version indicates that the child 
appeared before the court, was unable to take the oath, but nonetheless was allowed to testify 
at the trial.  Mosteller, supra at 928.  On appeal, the judges ruled that because she was unable 
to take the oath, she should not have been allowed to testify.  Id.  
  Brasier appears to have had no effect on the admissibility of children‘s hearsay state-
ments.  Lyon and LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1052.  Prior to Braiser, if a child was unavail-
able to testify, the child‘s hearsay statements were admitted on the grounds that it was the 
best evidence available.  Id. at 1034-35.  After Brasier, children were not presumed incom-
petent to testify.  See id. at 1053.  Rather, courts evaluated a child‘s testimonial competence 
and if the child was found competent to testify, he or she would be allowed to do so.  See id.  
If she was found incompetent, she would not be allowed to testify, but her hearsay state-
ments would be admissible.  See id. 
10
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a sexual abuse trial.67  In Brasier, a young rape victim, ―immediately 
on her coming home, told all the circumstances of the injury‖ to her 
mother.68  Brasier stands for the proposition that courts should assess 
a child for testimonial competence; thereby, children‘s hearsay 
statements were admissible only if they were found to be incompetent 
to testify.69 
Although children‘s hearsay statements regarding sexual 
abuse appear to have been freely admitted in criminal trials during 
this period of time, the weight given to these statements was often 
limited either by juror choice or pursuant to instructions from the 
judge.70  Rape convictions were rare.71  This was likely due to the dif-
ficulty of obtaining physical proof of the crime (rape required proof 
 
67 Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. at 203. 
68 Id.  Brasier is cited in Davis as support for the Court‘s conclusion that the 911 call was 
reporting an ongoing emergency and therefore not testimonial under the meaning of the Con-
frontation Clause.  Davis, 547 U.S. at 828.  In Davis, the Court noted that had the statements 
been the young girl‘s screams for help as her assailant was chasing her, the statements would 
have been made during an ongoing emergency.  Id.  However, by the time she reached home, 
her statements were nothing more than ―an account of past events.‖  Id.  The Davis Court‘s 
reference to this as instructive of the Framers‘ intent with respect to the Confrontation 
Clause has been criticized on the grounds that the authors of the Sixth Amendment would 
probably not have been aware of the Brasier decision.  Mosteller, supra note 66, at 924-25.  
The Sixth Amendment was proposed to Congress in 1789 and ratified in 1791.  Id. at 924.  
The Brasier decision was handed down in 1779.  Id.  However, it was not published until 
1791, and, the English Reporter cited by the Davis Court for the Brasier decision was not 
published until 1925.  Id. at 923-24.  In Bryant, Justice Scalia mockingly suggested that the 
majority would use this case as support for their holding that the declarant‘s statements were 
nontestimonial.  Justice Scalia stated: 
But today‘s majority presumably would hold the daughter‘s account to 
her mother a nontestimonial statement made during an ongoing emer-
gency.  She could not have known whether her attacker might reappear 
to attack again or attempt to silence the lone witness against him.  Her 
mother likely listened to the account to assess the threat to her own safe-
ty and to decide whether the rapist posed a threat to the community that 
required the immediate intervention of the local authorities. 
Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
69 Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1054-55 (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, A 
TREATISE ON THE SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW §1760, at 241 (1904)).  It 
has been suggested that Brasier does reflect the contemporary thinking of the judges at that 
time regarding a child‘s competency as a witness and the significance of the oath.  Id. at 
1053.  Interestingly, the judges did not appear to be concerned with the issue of whether her 
statements were testimonial.  See Mosteller, supra note 66, at 925-26. 
70 Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1046.  Lyon and LaMagna reviewed all of the cas-
es involving child sexual abuse that were tried between the years 1684 and 1789 from the 
Old Bailey Session Papers.  Id. at 1039, 1041.  ―The Old Bailey was the trial court for felo-
nies committed in London and . . . in the adjoining county of Middlesex.‖  Id. at 1039. 
71 Id. at 1047. 
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of penetration), the fact that delays in reporting were considered evi-
dence that the rape did not occur, and because rape was a capital     
offense (jurors may have been reluctant to convict the defendant 
based solely on the statements of a child).72  It is against this histori-
cal backdrop that the Confrontation Clause became part of the Sixth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.73 
III. THE U.S. SUPREME COURT’S MODERN 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CASES 
 
Since 1980, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued a series of 
seminal decisions involving hearsay evidence and the modern day de-
fendant‘s Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. 
A. Ohio v. Roberts 
In Ohio v. Roberts,
74
 the issue before the Court was whether a 
declarant‘s preliminary hearing testimony could be admitted in a sub-
sequent criminal trial on the same matter when she was unavailable at 
trial and where she was not cross-examined at the preliminary hear-
ing.75  The respondent, Roberts, was arrested and charged with forg-
ing checks belonging to Bernard Isaacs and possession of stolen cre-
dit cards belonging to Bernard and Amy Isaacs, the parents of the 
declarant, Anita Isaacs.76  At the preliminary hearing Robert‘s attor-
ney called Anita Isaacs to the stand where she testified that she knew 
 
72 Id. at 1047-48.  Even though hearsay appears to have been freely admitted, the re-
searchers reported an eighty-six percent acquittal rate, or nineteen out of twenty-two trials.  
Lyon & LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1047.  The researchers have theorized that judges may 
have instructed jurors to ignore the hearsay evidence.  Id. at 1046.  The researchers also 
found numerous references to the insufficiency of the evidence to prove rape, particularly in 
the absence of the child victim‘s testimony.  Id. at 1050-52.  They found that in nine of the 
nineteen acquittals, although the defendants were acquitted of the rape charges, they were 
bound over to await a new trial on a lesser charge such as assault or attempted rape.  Id. at 
1051.  They noted that child hearsay could be used to support a charge of assault or at-
tempted rape, even while being insufficient to support a capital rape conviction.  Id. at 1051-
52.  The hearsay evidence was found to be ―insufficient rather than inadmissible.‖  Lyon & 
LaMagna, supra note 64, at 1052. 
73 U.S. CONST. amend VI states in part: ―In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him . . . .‖ 
74 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
75 Id. at 58. 
76 Id. at 58-59. 
12
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Roberts and that she had allowed him to stay at her apartment for a 
few days while she was away.77  During defense counsel‘s direct ex-
amination, counsel tried to get Anita Isaacs to admit that she had giv-
en Roberts the checks and credit cards, but she denied doing so.78  
Defense counsel did not request to treat her as a hostile witness.79  
She was not questioned by the prosecutor.80 
Anita Isaacs left town following the preliminary hearing; al-
though the prosecution issued several subpoenas, they were unable to 
procure her attendance at trial.81  Roberts took the stand during his 
trial and testified that Anita had given him the credit cards and the 
checks with the understanding that he was free to use them.82  On re-
buttal, the prosecution offered into evidence the transcript of Anita 
Isaacs‘ preliminary hearing testimony.83  The court allowed the tran-
script into evidence, and the jury convicted Roberts on all counts.84 
The Supreme Court began its discussion by noting that while 
the Confrontation Clause prefers ―face-to-face confrontation at trial,‖ 
the primary interest is the right of cross-examination.85  The Court al-
so noted that this right is not absolute, stating, ― ‗[G]eneral rules of 
law of this kind, however beneficent in their operation and valuable 
to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of pub-
lic policy and the necessities of the case.‘ ‖86  The Court further ex-
plained that ―[t]he Confrontation Clause operates in two [distinct] 
ways to restrict the [scope] of admissible hearsay.‖87  First, a rule of 
necessity is implicit in the Sixth Amendment, which requires that the 
 
77 Id. at 58. 
78 Id. 
79 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 58. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 59-60. 
82 Id. at 59. 
83 Id.  The prosecution relied on an Ohio statute that permitted the use of preliminary ex-
amination testimony of a witness who ― ‗cannot for any reason be produced at the trial           
. . . .‘ ‖  Roberts, 448 U.S. at 59 (quoting OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2945.49 (West 1975)).  
The trial court conducted a voir dire hearing, and the court admitted the transcript into evi-
dence after testimony from Amy Isaacs in which she stated that she had no way to reach her 
daughter.  Id. at 59-60. 
84 Id. at 60. 
85 Id. at 63 (― ‗[A] primary interest secured by [the provision] is the right of cross-
examination.‘ ‖ (alteration in the original) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 418 
(1965))). 
86 Id. at 64 (quoting Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895)). 
87 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65 (italics omitted). 
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hearsay declarant be unavailable at trial.88  Second, the Confrontation 
Clause only allows the admission of that hearsay evidence which is 
found to be trustworthy; the statement must bear adequate ―indicia of 
reliability.‖89  The Court stated that ―[r]eliability [could] be inferred‖ 
where the hearsay ―falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception,‖ 
and that if it does not, then it may be admitted upon ―a showing of 
particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.‖90  The Court concluded 
that Anita Isaacs‘ preliminary examination testimony bore adequate 
indicia of reliability because Roberts‘ attorney challenged her testi-




89 Id. at 66 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 70.  Two decisions involving children‘s hearsay statements and the Confrontation 
Clause were decided in the decade following the Roberts decision.  See Idaho v. Wright, 497 
U.S. 805 (1990); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346 (1992).  Wright involved the admissibility 
of hearsay statements made by a young child to a physician identifying her abuser.  Wright, 
497 U.S. at 808.  The trial court admitted the statements under its residual hearsay exception.  
Id. at 811.  The Idaho Supreme Court reversed.  Id. at 813 (citing State v. Wright, 775 P.2d 
1224, 1231 (Idaho 1989)).  The United States Supreme Court noted that in order for hearsay 
statements to be admissible in a criminal trial, the statements ―must possess indicia of relia-
bility by virtue of [their] inherent trustworthiness . . . .‖  Id. at 822.  The Court examined ―the 
totality of the circumstances surrounding‖ the young child‘s statements to the physician, in-
cluding her age, her motive to fabricate, and the suggestive manner of the physician‘s ques-
tioning, and concluded that the State had failed to show that her incriminating statements 
were particularly trustworthy.  Id. at 826.  It also held that evidence corroborating the truth 
of a hearsay statement may not be used to support a finding that the statement possesses in-
dicia of reliability sufficient to meet the demands of the Confrontation Clause.  Wright, 497 
U.S. at 823.  The Court noted that physical evidence of sexual abuse sheds no light on the 
reliability of a child‘s statement identifying her abuser.  Id. at 826.  The Court did note how-
ever, that ―the presence of corroborating evidence‖ might be used to demonstrate that the 
admission of the hearsay statement would be harmless error.  Id. at 823. 
  In White, the second case decided in the decade following the Roberts decision, the 
Court held that the Confrontation Clause does not require a showing of unavailability before 
a young child‘s hearsay statements could be admitted under ―a firmly rooted exception to the 
hearsay rule.‖  White, 502 U.S. at 356.  Here, a four-year-old child made statements to her 
mother, her babysitter, a police officer, an emergency room nurse, and a physician.  Id. at 
349-50.  The trial court admitted these statements as either excited utterances or statements 
made in seeking medical treatment (two of the exceptions to the hearsay rule).  Id. at 350-51.  
The Supreme Court upheld the trial court‘s ruling finding that ―a statement that qualifies for 
admission under a ‗firmly rooted‘ hearsay exception is so trustworthy that adversarial testing 
can be expected to add little to its reliability.‖  Id. at 357.  This decision has subsequently 
been criticized by the Crawford Court, the Davis Court, and Justice Scalia‘s dissenting opi-
nion in Bryant.  See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Davis, 547 U.S. at 
825; Crawford, 541 U.S. at 58 n.8. 
14
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B. Crawford v. Washington 
In Crawford v. Washington,
92
 the Court overruled its decision 
in Roberts.93  Justice Scalia, writing for a seven Justice majority, held 
that the prosecution‘s use of a tape-recorded statement, obtained by 
police during an interrogation of the defendant‘s wife, in the defen-
dant‘s subsequent trial for assault and attempted murder violated the 
Confrontation Clause because the defendant‘s wife was not available 
to testify at trial.94 
The facts of the case are as follows.  Michael Crawford and 
his wife, Sylvia, had gone in search of Kenneth Lee after Sylvia      
informed Michael that Lee had attempted to assault her.95  They 
found Lee at his apartment where a fight ensued.96  During the fight, 
Lee was stabbed in the chest and Michael‘s hand was cut.97  The po-
lice arrested Michael and Sylvia who were subsequently interrogated 
separately after being given appropriate Miranda warnings.98  Al-
though Michael and Sylvia‘s accounts of the events leading up to the 
assault were substantially similar, their accounts differed as to wheth-
er Lee had drawn a weapon before Michael assaulted him.99  Michael 
was subsequently charged with stabbing Lee.100  The police did not 
press charges against Sylvia.101 
At trial, Michael claimed self-defense.102  Due to the state‘s 
marital privilege, Sylvia was unavailable to testify.103  The prosecu-
tion sought to introduce the statements that Sylvia had made to the 
police following the assault in order to show that Michael did not stab 
Lee in self-defense.104  The trial court, following the decision in Ro-
 
92 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
93 Id. at 68-69. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 38. 
96 Id. 
97 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. at 38-40. 
100 Id. at 40. 
101 Id. 
102 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 40. 
103 Id. 
104 Id.  Although Sylvia‘s statements generally corroborated those given by Michael, they 
differed on one significant point – whether Lee had a weapon.  Michael stated: 
        I could a swore I seen him goin‘ [sic] for somethin‘ [sic] before, 
right before everything happened.  He was like reachin‘ [sic], fiddlin‘ 
15
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berts, admitted the statements into evidence on the grounds that the 
statements bore ―particularized guarantees of trustworthiness.‖105  As 
a result, Michael was convicted of assault.106  On appeal the Wash-
ington Court of Appeals reversed; however, the Washington Supreme 
Court agreed with the trial court and reinstated the conviction.107 
Justice Scalia authored the Supreme Court‘s opinion, starting 
with a lengthy discussion of the history of the Sixth Amendment‘s 
Confrontation Clause, in which he traced its roots to the common law 
of England.108  He also discussed the controversial ex parte examina-
tion procedures that were employed in the Colonies during the eigh-
teenth century.109  He suggested that this history permits two infe-
rences about the meaning of the Confrontation Clause.110  First, the 
Confrontation Clause was specifically directed at the ―use of ex parte 
examinations as evidence‖ in criminal proceedings against the ac-
cused; and second, ―the Framers would not have allowed [the] admis-
sion of testimonial statements‖ of an unavailable witness unless the 
defendant was previously afforded an opportunity for cross-
examination.111 
Justice Scalia explained that the Confrontation Clause applies 
to witnesses – ―those who ‗bear testimony,‘ ‖ and that testimony is    
― ‗a solemn declaration or affirmation made for the purpose of estab-
lishing or proving some fact.‘ ‖112  He further explained, in a now oft-
quoted phrase: ―An accuser who makes a formal statement to gov-
ernment officers bears testimony in a sense that a person who makes 
 
[sic] around down here and stuff . . . and I just . . . I don‘t know, I think, 
this is just a possibility, but I think, I think that he pulled somethin‘ [sic] 
out and I grabbed for it and that‘s how I got cut . . . but I‘m not positive. 
Id. at 38-39.  Conversely, Sylvia stated: 
        Okay, he lifted his hand over his head maybe to strike Michael‘s 
hand down or something and then he put his hands in his . . . put his right 
hand in his right pocket . . . took a step back . . . Michael proceeded to 
stab him . . . then his hands were like . . . how do you explain this . . . 
open arms . . . with his hands open and he fell down . . . and we ran. 
Id. at 39.  She also stated that she did not see anything in Lee‘s hands during the fight.  
Crawford, 541 U.S. at 38. 
105 Id. at 40 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
106 Id. at 41. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 43-47. 
109 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 47. 
110 Id. at 50. 
111 Id. at 50, 53-54. 
112 Id. at 51 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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a casual remark to an acquaintance does not.‖113  He provided several 
examples of testimonial statements including ex parte in-court testi-
mony, affidavits, prior testimony that did not provide an opportunity 
for cross-examination, grand jury proceedings, and custodial exami-
nations, and concluded that testimonial statements are ―statements 
that were made under circumstances which would lead an objective 
witness reasonably to believe that the statement would be available 
for use at a later trial.‖114 
Justice Scalia criticized the Court‘s previous decision in Ro-
berts on the grounds that conditioning the admissibility of hearsay   
evidence on whether it ―bears particularized guarantees of trustwor-
thiness‖ or ―falls [within] a firmly rooted hearsay exception‖ is in 
conflict with the original meaning of the Confrontation Clause, prin-
cipally because it allows a jury to hear evidence, which can include 
statements that are in fact ex parte testimony, upon a simple judicial 
determination of reliability.115  In responding to the dissent‘s argu-
ment that the fact that a statement might be testimonial does not un-
dermine the ―wisdom‖ of the hearsay exceptions, he stated: 
Involvement of government officers in the production 
of testimony with an eye toward trial presents unique 
potential for prosecutorial abuse—a fact borne out 
 
113 Id. 
114 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 51-52 (internal quotation marks omitted).  He also explained 
that statements taken by police officers at interrogations are testimonial, in that they ―bear a 
striking resemblance to the examinations conducted by justices of the peace in England.‖  Id. 
at 52.  The fact that the ―interrogators are police officers rather than magistrates does not 
change‖ the outcome.  Id. at 53.  Noting the function – he commented that English justices of 
the peace did not function as the magistrates of today; rather, they had essentially an inves-
tigative and prosecutorial role.  Id.  He also noted that there could be various definitions of 
―interrogation‖ just as there are of ―testimonial.‖  Id. at n.4.  He refused to articulate a com-
prehensive definition of ―testimonial,‖ noting: ―Whatever else the term covers, it applies at 
minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand jury, or at a former tri-
al; and to police interrogations.‖  Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
115 Id. at 60 (internal quotation marks omitted).  He criticized one court for finding that a 
witness‘s statements that were made to the police while in custody were reliable because 
they were clearly against the declarant‘s penal interest.  Id. at 63 (citing Nowlin v. Com-
monwealth, 579 S.E.2d 367, 371-72 (Va. Ct. App. 2003)).  He also criticized other courts 
that found that statements were reliable because they were made under oath in a judicial pro-
ceeding such as a plea allocution or before a grand jury.  Id. at 65 (citing United States v. 
Gallego, 191 F.3d 156, 168 (2d Cir. 1999) (plea allocution); United States v. Papajohn, 212 
F.3d 1112, 1120 (8th Cir. 2000) (grand jury testimony)).  He noted: ―Dispensing with con-
frontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial be-
cause a defendant is obviously guilty.  This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.‖  
Id. at 62. 
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time and again throughout a history with which the 
Framers were keenly familiar.  This consideration 
does not evaporate when testimony happens to fall 
within some broad, modern hearsay exception, even if 
that exception might be justifiable in other circums-
tances.116 
In closing, he noted that where testimonial evidence is at issue, ―the 
Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavai-
lability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination.‖117 
C.  Davis v. Washington 
One year after its decision in Crawford, the Court granted cer-
tiorari in Davis v. Washington.118  In Davis, the Court consolidated 
two cases for review.
119
  The consolidated cases were Davis v. Wash-
ington and Hammon v. Indiana.120  In Davis, Michelle McCottry 
made a 911 emergency call during a domestic dispute with her boy-
friend, Adrian Davis.121  During the call, she identified Davis and in-
formed the operator that he was beating her with his fists.122  While 
she was speaking to the operator, Davis left the house and drove 
away in his car.123  The police arrived approximately four minutes 
later, finding McCottry in a ―shaken state [with] . . . injuries on her 
forearm and face.‖124  Davis was charged with a felony violation of a 
no-contact order.125  McCottry did not appear at trial and the court, 
over Davis‘ objections, admitted the recording of McCottry‘s 911 
call.126 
In Hammon, police officers responded to a domestic distur-
 
116 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7.  Furthermore, the historical sources demonstrate that 
there is little evidence of exceptions employed to allow the admission of testimonial state-
ments against an accused in a criminal trial.  Id.  He notes that the one deviation from this 
appears to be the exception for dying declarations – the existence of which he says cannot be 
disputed.  Id. at n.6. 
117 Id. at 68. 
118 547 U.S. 813 (2006). 
119 Id. at 817, 819.  
120 Id.  
121 Id. at 817. 
122 Id. 
123 Davis, 547 U.S. at 818. 
124 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
125 Id. 
126 Id. at 819. 
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bance report at the home of Hershel and Amy Hammon.127  When 
they arrived, they found Amy on the front porch alone.128  Although 
she appeared frightened, she told them that nothing was wrong.129  
When they entered the house, they noticed broken glass in the corner 
of the living room.130  They found Hershel in the kitchen, where he 
told the officers that he and his wife had been fighting ―but [that] 
everything was fine now.‖131  The officers separated Amy and Her-
shel and after Amy presented her side of the story, they had her fill 
out a battery affidavit.132  In the affidavit, she explained that Hershel 
had broken their furnace, shoved her onto the floor, hit her in the 
chest, broke some lamps, and attacked her daughter.133  Hershel was 
charged with domestic battery.134  Amy was subpoenaed but did not 
appear at trial.135  In her absence, the trial court allowed the officers 
to testify as to the statements she made and also granted the prosecu-
tion‘s motion to admit her affidavit.136 
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority and citing Crawford, 
noted that the Confrontation Clause prohibits the ― ‗admission of tes-
timonial statements of a witness unless the witness is unavailable to 
testify at trial and the defendant was afforded a prior opportunity for 
cross-examination.‘ ‖137  He noted that under the definition provided 
in Crawford, testimonial statements include ― ‗[s]tatements taken by 
police officers in the course of interrogations.‘ ‖138  However, he ex-
cluded police interrogations that occur in emergency situations from 
this rule, stating: 
Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances ob-
jectively indicating that the primary purpose of the in-
terrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
 
127 Id.  
128 Davis, 547 U.S. at 819. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
132 Id. at 819-20. 




137 Id. at 821 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54). 
138 Davis, 547 U.S. at 822 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 52). 
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circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.139 
The Court explained that in determining whether an interroga-
tion produced testimonial statements, courts should apply an objec-
tive test and determine the primary purpose of the interrogation.140  
Courts will need to consider whether the statements described a past 
event and whether a reasonable person in the listener‘s position 
would understand that the declarant‘s statements were a call for help 
amidst a genuine threat.141  Moreover, courts should examine the na-
ture of the questions asked and the responses received to determine 
whether the statements were necessary to allow law enforcement to 
respond to the present emergency.142  Finally, courts should consider 
the degree of formality surrounding the interview because this is an 
important factor in determining whether a declarant‘s statements are 
testimonial.143 
In applying these rules to Davis and Hammon, the Court 
found that in Davis, it was clear that the victim‘s statements made 
during the 911 call were a call for help.144  It was also clear from the 
nature of the questions asked by the 911 operator that the information 
elicited was necessary for the police to be able to respond to the 
present emergency.145  The Court contrasted Sylvia Crawford‘s 
statements at the police station with McCottry‘s frantic statements 
made during the 911 call and found that the level of informality in the 
latter situation supported the conclusion that her statements were not 
 
139 Id.  But see id. at n.2 (noting that although the holding refers to interrogations, ―state-
ments made in the absence of any interrogation[s] are [not] necessarily nontestimonial[,]‖ 
which suggests that volunteered statements or responses to open-ended questions might, un-
der the right circumstances, also be deemed testimonial for purposes of the Sixth Amend-
ment). 
140 Id. at 826. 
141 Id. at 826-27. 
142 Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. 
143 Id.; see also id. at 822 n.1 (noting that statements made in the absence of interrogation 
might also be testimonial such as volunteered testimony or answers to open-ended questions.  
Justice Scalia emphasized that the focus is on the declarant stating: ―[I]t is in the final analy-
sis the declarant‘s statements, not the interrogator‘s questions, that the Confrontation Clause 
requires us to evaluate.‖). 
144 Id. at 827 (citing Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 137 (1999) (plurality opinion)). 
145 Id. 
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testimonial.146 
By contrast, the Court found that Amy Hammon‘s statements 
to the police were testimonial.147  The Court noted that statements 
made during an interrogation, whose purpose is to determine the need 
for emergency assistance, may evolve into testimonial statements 
once the emergency has passed.148  The Court further noted that in 
Hammon, the emergency had ended by the time the officers arrived 
on the scene, and Amy Hammon, now protected by the police, was in 
no immediate danger.149  Therefore, the Court held that Amy and 
Hershel‘s statements to the police were testimonial because they were 
given some time after the dramatic events had ended and simply de-
scribed how the criminal acts began and ended.150 
Finally, the Court acknowledged the argument put forth by 
the State for greater flexibility in the use of hearsay testimony in cas-
es of domestic abuse because these crimes are ―notoriously suscepti-
ble‖ to intimidation of the victims by their assailants to assure that 
they do not testify.151  The Court recognized that the ―Confrontation 
Clause gives the criminal a windfall‖ when this occurs, but stated: 
―We may not . . . vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the 
effect of allowing the guilty to go free.‖152  It reminded the State that 
the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, which provides that a per-
son who attains the absence of a witness through wrongdoing forfeits 
the rights afforded by the Confrontation Clause, is the appropriate 
doctrine to be applied in these types of cases.153 
D. Michigan v. Bryant 
In Michigan v. Bryant,
154
 the Court examined the parameters 
of the ongoing emergency rule it established in Davis and held that 
 
146 Davis, 547 U.S. at 827. 
147 Id. at 830. 
148 Id. at 828-29 (noting that when this occurs, courts ―[t]hrough in limine procedure[s] . . . 
should redact or exclude the portions of any statement that have become testimonial . . . .‖). 
149 Id. at 829-30. 
150 Id. at 830; see also Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (explaining that in Davis the respondent re-
lied on The King v. Brasier, 168 Eng. Rep. 202 (1779), but that case did not involve an on-
going emergency because the emergency had passed by the time the young girl came home 
to report to her mother that she had been sexually assaulted). 
151 Id. at 832-33.  
152 Id. at 833. 
153 Id. 
154 131 S. Ct. 1143 (2011). 
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the ―circumstances of the interaction between [the decedent] and the 
police objectively indicate[d] that the ‗primary purpose of the inter-
rogation‘ was ‗to enable police assistance to meet an ongoing emer-
gency.‘ ‖155 
In the early morning hours of April 29, 2001, the Detroit Po-
lice Department received a call from a gas station attendant reporting 
that a man had been shot.156  When the police arrived at the gas sta-
tion, they found the decedent, Anthony Covington, lying next to his 
car in the parking lot.157  The officers noticed that he had been shot in 
the abdomen.158  He also appeared to be in great pain and was having 
difficulty speaking.159  They asked Covington ― ‗what had happened, 
who had shot him, and where the shooting had occurred.‘ ‖160  He 
replied that ―Rick‖ had shot him about a half hour before.161  He also 
told the police that he had gone to the defendant‘s house, had a con-
versation with him through the back door of the house, and that the 
defendant shot him when he turned to leave.162  Covington then drove 
to the gas station where the police found him.163  Police officers ques-
tioned him for approximately five to ten minutes.164  The interroga-
tion ended when emergency medical personnel arrived at the scene.165 
Covington was taken to a local hospital where he died a few 
hours later.166  When the police later went to the defendant‘s house, 
they found Covington‘s wallet along with his identification in the 
back yard.167  They also noticed what appeared to be a bullet hole in 
the back door of the house and a bullet and blood on the back 
porch.168  Approximately one year later, Bryant was arrested in Cali-
 




159 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
160 Id. (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 768 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Mich. 2009), vacated, Bryant, 
131 S. Ct. at 1167). 
161 Id. (citing Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67 n.1). 
162 Id. 
163 Id. 
164 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
165 Id. 
166 Id. (indicating that at this time, the police called for backup and traveled to Bryant‘s 
house).  But see id. at 1173 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicating that it was approximately three 
hours before the police had ―secured the scene‖ of the shooting). 
167 Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67. 
168 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1150. 
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fornia and returned to Michigan, where he was subsequently tried for 
murder.169 
The trial court admitted the statements that Covington made 
to the police at the gas station in which he identified Bryant as his 
shooter.170  Bryant was convicted of second-degree murder.171  How-
ever, the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed his conviction.172  
Quoting Davis, it found that Covington‘s statements to the police 
were inadmissible on the grounds that they were testimonial hear-
say.173  The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.174 
Justice Sotomayor authored the majority opinion.175  She was 
joined by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Kennedy, Breyer, and 
Alito.176  Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Ginsburg, dissented.177  The 
majority opinion begins with a review of the Court‘s previous deci-
sions in Roberts, Crawford, and Davis.178  The majority reminds us of 
its ruling in Crawford, that the reach of the Confrontation Clause is 
limited to testimonial statements and that with respect to these state-
ments ―the Sixth Amendment ‗demands what the common law       
required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-
examination.‘ ‖179  The Court also explained that not all statements 
elicited as the result of police questioning are testimonial, quoting 
Davis, the Court stated: 
―Statements are nontestimonial when made in the 
course of police interrogation under circumstances ob-
jectively indicating that the primary purpose of the in-
terrogation is to enable police assistance to meet an 
ongoing emergency.  They are testimonial when the 
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no 
such ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events 
 
169 Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67. 
170 Id. at 68. 
171 Id. at 67-68. 
172 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1151 (citing Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67). 
173 Bryant, 768 N.W.2d at 67 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
174 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1152. 
175 Id. at 1149. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. (Justice Thomas filed a concurring opinion; Justice Kagan did not take part in the 
decision). 
178 Id. at 1152. 
179 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1152-53 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68). 
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potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖180 
The Court explained that Davis did not attempt to provide a 
complete categorization of all possible statements that should be con-
sidered testimonial.181  The Court commented that the most important 
situations in which the Confrontation Clause restricts the admission 
of out-of-court statements are those where ―state actors are involved 
in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence 
for trial.‖182 
Next, the Court described the steps that courts should follow 
in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation.183  Courts 
should perform an objective evaluation of the circumstances in which 
the encounter occurred and an objective assessment of the actions and 
statements of all of the parties involved.184  The Court explained the 
rationale for this approach: 
        An objective analysis of the circumstances of an 
encounter and the statements and actions of the parties 
to it provides the most accurate assessment of the 
‗primary purpose of the interrogation.‘  The circums-
tances in which an encounter occurs . . . are clearly 
matters of objective fact.  The statements and actions 
of the parties must also be objectively evaluated.  That 
is, the relevant inquiry is not the subjective or actual 
purpose of the individuals involved in a particular en-
counter, but rather the purpose that reasonable partici-
pants would have had, as ascertained from the indi-
viduals‘ statements and actions and the circumstances 
in which the encounter occurred.185 
Additionally, the Court noted that in assessing the               
circumstances under which statements are made, the existence of an 
ongoing emergency is one of the most important circumstances in  
determining the primary purpose of an interrogation, because an on-
going emergency focuses the individuals involved on something oth-
 
180 Id. at 1154 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
181 Id. at 1155. 
182 Id.; see also id. at n.3 (noting that as in Davis, it is explicitly reserving the question of 
whether statements made to persons other than law enforcement personnel can be testimoni-
al). 
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er than ― ‗prov[ing] past events potentially relevant to later criminal 
prosecution.‘ ‖186 
The Court, without explanation, further stated that in deter-
mining the primary purpose of an interrogation, ―standard rules of 
hearsay, designed to identify some statements as reliable, will be re-
levant.‖187  The Court also stated: 
Implicit in Davis is the idea that because the prospect 
of fabrication in statements given for the primary pur-
pose of resolving that emergency is presumably signif-
icantly diminished, the Confrontation Clause does not 
require such statements to be subject to the crucible of 
cross-examination.  This logic is not unlike that justi-
fying the excited utterance exception in hearsay law.188 
This focus on reliability has been absent from the Court‘s 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence since the Roberts decision.189 
The Court went on to explain that determining whether an 
emergency exists is a fact-dependent inquiry.190  It noted that the ex-
istence and duration of an emergency depends on ―the type and scope 
of danger posed to the victim, the police, and the public.‖191  The 
Court suggested that in cases such as Davis and Hammon, the emer-
gency will have a shorter duration than the one in the present case 
because domestic violence cases have a ―narrower zone of potential 
victims than cases involving threats to public safety.‖192  Further-
more, determining whether an emergency is ongoing will require a 
court to ascertain not only the type of weapon involved, but also a 
victim‘s medical condition at the time of the encounter.193  A victim‘s 
medical condition will be relevant because it ―sheds light on the abili-
ty of the victim to have any purpose at all in responding to police 
questions and on the likelihood that any purpose formed would nec-
essarily be a testimonial one.‖194 
 
186 Id. at 1157 (alteration in the original) (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
187 Id. at 1155. 
188 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1157. 
189 See id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
190 Id. at 1158 (majority opinion). 
191 Id. at 1162. 
192 Id. at 1158. 
193 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159. 
194 Id.; see also id. (noting, as it did in Davis, that an encounter that begins as an emergen-
cy requiring police to determine the need for assistance may not always remain one: the in-
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The Court next addressed the need to examine the statements 
and actions of the individuals involved including both the declarant‘s 
and the interrogator‘s questions and answers.195  The Court indicated 
that this type of examination will eliminate problems that can arise 
when either the declarant or the interrogator has mixed motives.196  
Although the Court emphasized that determining the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is an objective test, it appeared to introduce some 
subjectivity into the analysis when it stated: ―The existence of an 
emergency or the parties’ perception that an emergency is ongoing is 
among the most important circumstances that courts must take into 
account in determining whether an interrogation is testimonial            
. . . .‖197  The last factor that the Court found to be relevant to the    
determination of the primary purpose test is the degree of informality 
in the encounter.198 
In applying these rules to the case before it, the Court con-
cluded that there was an ongoing emergency at the time the police of-
ficers interrogated Covington.199  First, in assessing the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation, the Court noted that crimes involving 
guns result in a heightened state of emergency.200  This case involved 
an armed shooter whose whereabouts were unknown at the time of 
the interrogation.201  Second, in examining the statements and actions 
of the police officers, the Court found that they responded to a call 
that a man had been shot.202  Their questions to Covington focused on 
obtaining information about the shooting which was necessary to al-
low them to ― ‗assess the situation, the threat to their own safety, and 
possible danger to the potential victim‘ . . . .  In other words, they so-
licited the information necessary to enable them to ‗meet an ongoing 
emergency.‘ ‖203 
Third, in examining the declarant‘s statements and actions, 
the Court found that there was nothing in Covington‘s responses that 
would indicate that the emergency had ended because Covington did 
 
terrogation may evolve into a situation in which testimonial statements are made). 
195 Id. at 1160. 
196 Id. at 1161. 
197 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1162 (emphasis added). 
198 Id. at 1166. 
199 Id. 
200 Id. at 1158-59. 
201 Id. at 1165-66. 
202 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165. 
203 Id. at 1166 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822, 832). 
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not know where the shooter was, nor did he give any indication that 
his assailant, ―having shot at him twice, would be satisfied that [he] 
was only wounded.‖204  The Court also found that ―a person in Co-
vington‘s situation would [not] have had a ‗primary purpose‘ ‗to es-
tablish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal pros-
ecution,‘ ‖205 because at the time Covington made his statements, he 
―was lying in a gas station parking lot bleeding from a mortal gunshot 
wound to his abdomen‖ and repeatedly asked when the emergency 
medical personnel would arrive.206 
Finally, the Court found that the situation in Bryant was simi-
lar to the 911 phone call in Davis.207  It noted that ―the officers ar-
rived at different times,‖ the situation was ―fluid and somewhat con-
fused,‖ and that no structured interrogation took place.208  It 
concluded that the circumstances of the encounter, coupled with the 
statements and actions of Covington and the police officers, demon-
strated that the primary purpose of the interrogation was to enable the 
police to respond to an ongoing emergency.209  Hence, Covington‘s 
statements were ―not testimonial‖ and not barred by the Confronta-
tion Clause.210 
Justice Scalia delivered a scathing dissent, accusing the ma-
jority of ―distort[ing] our Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and 
leav[ing] it in a shambles.‖211  He disagreed with the majority‘s inter-
pretation of facts, stating: 
Today‘s tale—a story of five officers conducting suc-
cessive examinations of a dying man with the primary 
purpose, not of obtaining and preserving his testimony 
regarding his killer, but of protecting him, them, and 
others from a murderer somewhere on the loose – is so 
transparently false that professing to believe it de-
means this institution.212 
 
204 Id.  The Court also suggested that Covington did not have any ―reason to think that the 
shooter would not shoot again if he arrived on the scene.‖  Id. 
205 Id. at 1165 (quoting Davis, 547 U.S. at 822). 
206 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1165. 
207 Id. at 1166. 
208 Id. 
209 Id. at 1166-67. 
210 Id. at 1167. 
211 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
212 Id.  In arguing that the majority has created an ―expansive exception‖ for violent 
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He criticized the majority for creating an ―expansive excep-
tion to the Confrontation Clause for violent crimes.‖213  He com-
plained of the shift in focus from the declarant‘s intent to that of the 
interrogator,214 particularly in situations where the declarant may be 
operating under a disability.215  He also criticized the majority for 
 
crimes, Justice Scalia commented on the timeline for determining an ―ongoing emergency.‖  
Id. at 1173.  He criticized the majority for failing to answer the question of how long the 
emergency situation lasted.  Id.  In response to the majority‘s comments that the emergency 
may have persisted until the police determined the ―[shooter‘s] motive for and location after 
the shooting[,]‖ or until the police ―secured the scene of the shooting[,]‖ Justice Scalia 
stated: ―This is a dangerous definition of emergency[]‖ because many witnesses who testify 
against defendants at subsequent criminal trials give their first statements to police within 
hours of a violent act.  Id.  He also noted that if the prosecution can claim that there was an 
ongoing threat to the public, defendants will not have a constitutionally protected right to 
exclude this hearsay at their trials.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173.  He argued that the Framers 
would not have sanctioned this approach.  In support of this argument he cited The King v. 
Brasier, in which the court refused to allow the testimony of a mother‘s account of her 
young daughter‘s statements that were made to her immediately after she came home after 
being sexually abused.  Id.  He theorized that the majority would find the daughter‘s state-
ments to her mother to be nontestimonial because they were ―made during an ongoing emer-
gency.‖  Id.  He stated: 
[T]oday‘s majority presumably would hold the daughter‘s account to her 
mother a nontestimonial statement made during an ongoing emergency.  
She could not have known whether her attacker might reappear to attack 
again or attempt to silence the lone witness against him.  Her mother 
likely listened to the account to assess the threat to her own safety and to 
decide whether the rapist posed a threat to the community that required 
the immediate intervention of the local authorities.  Utter nonsense. 
Id. 
213 Id.  In determining Covington‘s purpose, Justice Scalia believed that his statements 
were made only to ensure the arrest and prosecution of Bryant.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1170.  
He also believed that Covington knew the threat ended when he fled from Bryant‘s house 
some twenty-five minutes earlier because he knew that he was shot by ―a drug dealer, not a 
spree killer who might randomly threaten others.‖  Id.  Likewise, Justice Scalia found that 
Covington‘s medical needs reinforced the testimonial nature of his statements because it is 
likely that he knew that the police were focused on investigating the crime, not concentrating 
on his medical needs.  Id. at 1171. 
214 Id. at 1168-69.  Justice Scalia noted that only the declarant‘s intent matters.  Id. at 
1168.  ―[T]he declarant must intend the statement to be a solemn declaration rather than an 
unconsidered or offhand remark[,]‖ and he should make the statement with the understand-
ing that it may be used in subsequent criminal proceedings.  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1168-69.  
He did note, however, that the identity of the interrogator, together with the content and tone 
of his questions may be relevant, but only because it may bear upon whether the declarant 
intended to make a solemn statement which he understood could be used in a criminal trial.  
Id. at 1169. 
215 Id.  Justice Scalia touched upon the question of how to assess whether a declarant with 
diminished capacity has made testimonial statements, but noted that the question was not 
raised in the case.  Id.  He commented that substituting the intentions of the police for those 
of the declarant in these types of situations is wrong.  Id.  He noted: ―When the declarant has 
diminished capacity, focusing on the interrogators make less sense, not more. . . .  But a per-
28
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reintroducing the reliability factor back into the legal analysis.216  Jus-
tice Scalia concluded: 
        Judicial decisions, like the Constitution itself, are 
nothing more than parchment barriers.  Both depend 
on a judicial culture that understands its constitutional-
ly assigned role, has the courage to persist in that role 
when it means announcing unpopular decisions, and 
has the modesty to persist when it produces results 
that go against the judges‘ policy preferences.  To-
day‘s opinion falls far short of living up to that obliga-
tion—short on the facts, and short on the law. 
        For all I know, Bryant has received his just 
deserts.  But he surely has not received them pursuant 
to the procedures that our Constitution requires.  And 
what has been taken away from him has been taken 
away from us all.217 
IV. DECISIONS IN THE STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
PRIOR TO MICHIGAN V. BRYANT 
A. Children’s Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual 
Abuse Prosecution Cases Following Ohio v. Roberts 
Following the Supreme Court‘s decision in Roberts, admis-
sion of children‘s hearsay statements in criminal prosecutions would 
not violate a defendant‘s right to confrontation provided the state-
ments bore adequate ―indicia of reliability.‖218  Additionally, courts 
could infer reliability if the hearsay fell ―within a firmly rooted hear-
say exception.‖219  The two hearsay exceptions that were routinely 
 
son who cannot perceive his own purposes certainly cannot perceive why a listener might be 
interested in what he has to say.‖  Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1169. 
216 Id. at 1176.  Justice Scalia noted this is at direct odds with the decision in Crawford in 
which the Court stated: ― ‗Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of 
reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually 
prescribes: confrontation.‘ ‖  Id. at 1174 (quoting Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69).  He ques-
tioned whether the majority intended to resurrect the Roberts decision ―by a thousand un-
principled distinctions without ever explicitly overruling Crawford?‖  Id. at 1175. 
217 Id. at 1176 (internal quotations omitted). 
218 Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980). 
219 Id. 
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applied to children‘s hearsay statements in cases of child sexual 
abuse were the excited utterance exception and the exception for 
statements made in connection with medical diagnosis and treat-
ment.220  Courts have also admitted children‘s statements under the 
residual or catchall exceptions to the hearsay rule.221 
The vast majority of reported cases dealing with the medical 
diagnosis and treatment exception involve child sexual abuse, al-
though prosecutions of these crimes comprise only a small percen-
tage of criminal cases.222  There are several issues that arise in con-
nection with the use of this hearsay exception.  The first issue is 
whether the proponent of the evidence should be required to demon-
strate a connection between a declarant‘s motivation for making the 
statements and the circumstances surrounding the examination and 
treatment.  Some jurisdictions freely admit children‘s statements re-
garding sexual abuse without requiring any connection between the 
treatment and the children‘s appreciation of the purpose for the 
treatment, while others do not.223  Another issue that arises in connec-
tion with this hearsay exception, since the Federal Rules of Evidence 
do not provide a definition of medical treatment or diagnosis, is what 
is properly included within the meaning of treatment or diagnosis.224  
There are also concerns surrounding the use of this exception for the 
treatment of psychological maladies.225 
The most significant issue on which courts have disagreed is 
whether children‘s statements, made in connection with a physical 
examination in which they identified their perpetrator, are admissible 
under the medical diagnosis or treatment exception to the hearsay 
rule.226  These types of identifying statements can be particularly da-
 
220 See Wright, 497 U.S. at 820 (explaining, in general, the rationale for the excited utter-
ance and medical treatment hearsay exceptions). 
221 See id. at 816 (discussing the Idaho trial court‘s use of the residual evidence exception 
in admitting hearsay declarations of a two and a half year old sexual abuse victim). 
222 Robert P. Mosteller, Children as Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Trial Process: 
The Maturation and Disintegration of the Hearsay Exception for Statements for Medical Ex-
amination in Child Sexual Abuse Cases, 65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 47, 56 (2002). 
223 Id. at 51-52.  The traditional justification for this exception is based on the idea that 
patients have a selfish treatment interest in providing truthful information to the physician 
along with the fact that they expect that the physician will rely on the information in diag-
nosing and treating them.  Id. 
224 Id. at 47-48. 
225 Id. at 54. 
226 See, e.g., United States v. Iron Shell, 633 F.2d 77, 84 (8th Cir. 1980) (noting that 
statements identifying a child‘s assailant ―would seldom, if ever, be sufficiently related‖ to 
diagnosis or treatment).  But see United States v. Edward J., 224 F.3d 1216, 1219-20 (10th 
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maging to defendants because they may be the only statement identi-
fying the defendant as the abuser if the child is unable to testify.227  
Furthermore, even if the children testify, these hearsay statements are 
often more detailed than their actual testimony and therefore more 
powerful.228  Finally, these statements can be particularly harmful if 
used as corroborating evidence because they can sway the jury      
towards conviction and be viewed merely as harmless error on       
appeal.229 
Courts that have held that these statements of identification 
are not covered by the medical treatment or diagnosis exception cite 
to the Advisory Committee‘s Note to Federal Rule of Evidence 
803(4), which indicates that statements of cause will qualify under 
the rule, whereas statements of fault will not.230  The Committee Note 
provides the following example: ―[A] patient‘s statement that he was 
struck by an automobile would qualify but not his statement that the 
car was driven through a red light.‖231  Under this rationale, child-
ren‘s statements describing the abuse are statements related to cause 
and relevant to proper diagnosis and treatment; whereas children‘s 
statements identifying the perpetrator are statements of fault and not 
medically pertinent. 
Courts that have allowed children‘s hearsay statements of 
identification, made in connection with medical diagnosis or treat-
ment, have justified their decisions on varying grounds.  Some courts 
have viewed children‘s identification of their perpetrator to be rele-
vant to medical diagnosis or treatment, reasoning that this informa-
tion could provide a possible source of sexually transmitted disease 
or pregnancy, even in the absence of evidence to suggest these factors 
are at issue in the case.232  Other courts have reasoned that children‘s 
 
Cir. 2000). 
227 Mosteller, supra note 222, at 60-61. 
228 Id. at 61. 
229 Id.  
230 FED. R. EVID. 803 advisory committee‘s note. 
231 Id. 
232 See, e.g., People v. Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 1992).  The court adopted an 
expansive interpretation of ‗diagnosis and treatment‘ and, based on this, found that identifi-
cation of a child‘s assailant could be important to the health of a child if the child has con-
tracted a sexually transmitted disease and identification may be necessary for the assessment 
of pregnancy and in vitro problems related to genetic characteristics.  Id. at 629.  It also 
commented that treatment of a sexually abused child has psychological and developmental 
components that must be addressed.  Id.  The court found that identification of the assailant 
was necessary for treatment because when the physician learned that the assailant lived in 
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identification of their perpetrator was necessary because a doctor has 
an ethical responsibility to assure that any future contact between the 
child and perpetrator is eliminated if the perpetrator is a member of 
the child‘s household.233  Still others have opined that identification 
was medically related because it was relevant to the psychological 
well-being of the child.234  These latter two reasons  appear more ap-
propriately rooted in social welfare concerns than medical concerns 
and demonstrate how the medical treatment exception, as applied to 
child abuse prosecutions, has been clearly ―stretched beyond the 
bounds of its theoretical justification.‖235 
Moreover, other courts, following the Supreme Court‘s deci-
sion in Ohio v. Roberts,236 have given less consideration to establish-
ing a connection between children‘s statements and the reason for the 
medical treatment and have instead focused principally on determin-
ing whether the statements were inherently trustworthy.237  The Mich-
igan Supreme Court‘s decision in People v. Meeboer238 exemplifies 
 
the victim‘s home, he ―began her future treatment by alerting the authorities.‖  Id. at 631. 
233 Mosteller, supra note 222, at 63; see, e.g., Hawkins v. State, 72 S.W.3d 493, 498 (Ark. 
2002) (finding that disclosure of the identity of the perpetrator allowed the physician to ful-
fill her duty to report the abuse to state authorities). 
234 Mosteller, supra note 222, at 50-51, 63. 
235 Id. at 47, 65. 
236 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
237 See Christopher B. Mueller & Laird C. Kirkpatrick, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 309-19 (3rd 
ed. 2009) (discussing Mississippi and New Hampshire statutes that require a court to find a 
child‘s statements made for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment to also be ―made 
under circumstances indicating their trustworthiness‖). 
238 484 N.W.2d 621 (Mich. 1992).  In this case, the court consolidated three cases for re-
view.  Id. at 622.  The first case, People v. Conn, involved a seven-year-old who was taken 
by her mother to a physician two days after she complained of pain in her vaginal area.  Id. 
at 630.  During the examination, and in response to questioning by the physician, she identi-
fied the defendant, who had been residing in her home, as the one who had sexually as-
saulted her.  Id.  She initially told the doctor that she fell on her bicycle and that a ―boy‖ had 
been ― ‗messing‘ with her.‖  Id. at 623.  After repeated questioning she identified the defen-
dant as her assailant.  Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 623, 630. Following the examination, the 
physician contacted law enforcement authorities.  Id. at 623.  The defendant was charged 
with criminal sexual conduct in the first degree.  Id.  The complainant testified at trial and 
identified the defendant as her assailant.  Id.  The physician‘s testimony corroborated the 
complainant‘s testimony.  See id. (detailing procedures leading to defendant‘s conviction 
using victim‘s testimony and physician‘s expert testimony; the issue in the case was whether 
the physician‘s testimony was based on hearsay).  In the first of the three cases, the court 
held that the complainant‘s statements were trustworthy based on ―circumstantial evidence 
of her understanding of the need to be truthful,‖ even though the child had given inconsistent 
statements of identification.  Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 630. 
  In People v. Meeboer, a six-year-old girl reported that the defendant sexually assaulted 
her while she was visiting his home, eleven days prior.  Id. at 624.  She was taken to the hos-
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this approach.239  The court, citing Idaho v. Wright,240 examined the 
totality of the circumstances in order to determine whether the child-
ren‘s statements ― ‗possess[ed the necessary] indicia of reliability [to 
be deemed admissible] by virtue of [their] inherent trustworthiness.‘ 
‖241  In doing so, it identified numerous factors to consider in making 
this determination, including: (1) whether the child understood the 
need to tell the truth; (2) the age and maturity of the child; (3) the 
child‘s use of age appropriate language; (4) the party initiating the 
examination; and (5) whether there is a motive on the part of the 
child to fabricate.242 
 
pital by her mother, where she was examined by Dr. Karen Bentley, a specialist in child sex-
ual abuse and a member of the child sexual abuse team at the hospital.  Id. at 624, 631.  The 
record indicated that the family had reported the incident to the police prior to the examina-
tion and that Dr. Bentley was aware of the suspected abuse prior to her examination of the 
complainant.  Id. at 631.  She concluded that sexual abuse had occurred and promptly re-
ported this information to the authorities.  Id. at 624.  At trial, Dr. Bentley testified about the 
physical evidence of sexual abuse and the complainant‘s identification of the defendant as 
her abuser.  Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 624.  The court found sufficient circumstantial evi-
dence of trustworthiness in the child‘s statements in the second case, yet in this case, it based 
its conclusion on the lack of evidence in the record.  Id. at 631.  Yet, the court found that 
there was no evidence that the child had fabricated the story; there was no evidence to ex-
plain how the child seemed to understand the nature of sexual intercourse; there was no evi-
dence of the use of leading questions; and even though the allegations had been reported to 
the police and the physician before the examination, it found: ―there is no indication that the 
examination was a pretext for an investigation.‖  Id. 
  In the third case, People v. Craft, the defendant was charged with sexually assaulting 
his four-year-old stepdaughter.  Id. at 625.  The action originated from reports that the 
child‘s teachers had made to child protective services.  Id.  The complainant‘s mother took 
her to a physician four days after her teachers filed their report.  Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 
625.  Following the examination, the doctor concluded that she had been sexually abused 
and reported his findings and conclusions to the authorities.  Id.  The child was removed 
from her home and placed in foster care.  Id.  However, she had made some conflicting 
statements to Dr. Cooke at one point telling him that someone other than the defendant had 
touched her two months later.  Id.  Complainant‘s foster mother took her to see a different 
physician who examined her and who also noticed physical signs of sexual abuse.  Id.  Dur-
ing this examination, the young child identified the defendant as her abuser.  Meeboer, 484 
N.W.2d  at 625.  The court found that there was not sufficient evidence of trustworthiness to 
support the admissibility of the child‘s statements.  Id. at 633.  In reaching its conclusion, the 
court relied on the fact that the child was only four years old and had been removed from her 
home at the time she identified the defendant as her abuser, coupled with the active partici-
pation of investigative authorities prior to the physical examination.  Id. at 632-33. 
239 Id. at 621. 
240 497 U.S. 805 (1990). 
241 Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 626 (quoting Wright, 497 U.S. at 822). 
242 Id. at 627 (―Factors related to trust-worthiness guarantees surrounding the actual mak-
ing of the statement include: (1) the age and maturity of the declarant, (2) the manner in 
which the statements are elicited (leading questions may undermine the trustworthiness of a 
statement), (3) the manner in which the statements are phrased (childlike terminology may 
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Another frequently employed exception to the hearsay rule in 
child sexual abuse prosecutions is the residual or catchall exception 
which allows the admission of hearsay statements that possess ―cir-
cumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness‖ provided the court finds: 
―(A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the 
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than 
any other evidence which the proponent can procure through reason-
able efforts; and (C) the general purposes of these rules and the inter-
ests of justice will best be served by admission of the statement into 
evidence.‖243  This exception has been applied to allow the admission 
of children‘s statements to social workers and other professionals 
outside of the medical field.244  In People v. Katt,245 the court found 
that statements made by a seven-year-old boy to a child-protective-
services worker, following a report of suspected abuse in which he 
described his abuse and named the defendant as his abuser, were ad-
missible.246 
The Michigan Supreme Court found that one of the require-
ments embodied in the residual exception, that the statements have 
―circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness,‖247 was in line with the 
 
be evidence of genuineness), (4) use of terminology unexpected of a child of similar age, (5) 
who initiated the examination (prosecutorial initiation may indicate that the examination was 
not intended for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment), (6) the timing of the examina-
tion in relation to the assault (the child is still suffering pain and distress), (7) the timing of 
the examination in relation to the trial (involving the purpose of the examination), (8) the 
type of examination (statements made in the course of treatment for psychological disorders 
may not be as reliable), (9) the relation of the declarant to the person identified (evidence 
that the child did not mistake the identity), and (10) the existence of or lack of motive to fa-
bricate.‖); see People v. Katt, 662 N.W.2d 12, 24 (Mich. 2003) (listing fifteen non-inclusive 
factors courts will consider in determining reliability). 
243 The Federal Residual Exception, Federal Rule of Evidence 807 also provides: 
However, a statement may not be admitted under this exception unless 
the proponent of it makes known to the adverse party sufficiently in ad-
vance of the trial or hearing to provide the adverse party with a fair op-
portunity to prepare to meet it, the proponent‘s intention to offer the 
statement and the particulars of it, including the name and address of the 
declarant. 
FED. R. EVID. 807. 
244 See, e.g., United States v. Grooms, 978 F.2d 425, 427-28 (8th Cir. 1992) (admitting 
statements made by young girls to an FBI agent under the residual exception to the hearsay 
rule). 
245 662 N.W.2d 12 (Mich. 2003). 
246 Id. at 14-15. 
247 Id. at 23.  The court referred to fifteen factors that courts have found to be relevant in 
evaluating the trustworthiness of statements, citing Federal Rules of Evidence Manual, Mat-
thew Bender & Co. Inc. 2002 §807.02(4).  Id. at 24.  These factors are: 
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requirements of the Confrontation Clause.248  In this case, the court 
 
(1) The relationship between the declarant and the person to whom the 
statement was made.  For example, a statement to a trusted confidante 
should be considered more reliable than a statement to a total stranger. 
(2) The capacity of the declarant at the time of the statement.  For in-
stance, if the declarant [were] drunk or on drugs at the time, that would 
cut against a finding of trustworthiness . . . . 
(3) The personal truthfulness of the declarant.  If the declarant is an un-
truthful person, this cuts against admissibility, while an unimpeachable 
character for veracity cuts in favor of admitting the statement.  The gov-
ernment cannot seriously argue that the trust due an isolated statement 
should not be colored by compelling evidence of the lack of credibility 
of its source: although a checkout aisle tabloid might contain unvar-
nished truth, even a devotee would do well to view its claims with a 
measure of skepticism. 
(4) Whether the declarant appeared to carefully consider his statement. 
(5) Whether the declarant recanted or repudiated the statement after it 
was made. 
(6) Whether the declarant has made other statements that were either 
consistent or inconsistent with the proffered statement. 
(7) Whether the behavior of the declarant was consistent with the content 
of the statement. 
(8) Whether the declarant had personal knowledge of the event or condi-
tion described. 
(9) Whether the declarant‘s memory might have been impaired due to 
the lapse of time between the event and the statement. 
(10) Whether the statement, as well as the event described by the state-
ment, is clear and factual, or instead is vague and ambiguous. 
(11) Whether the statement was made under formal circumstances or 
pursuant to formal duties, such that the declarant would have been likely 
to consider the accuracy of the statement when making it. 
(12) Whether the statement appears to have been made in anticipation of 
litigation and is favorable to the person who made or prepared the state-
ment. 
(13) Whether the declarant was cross-examined by one who had interests 
similar to those of the party against whom the statement is offered. 
(14) Whether the statement was given voluntarily or instead pursuant to 
a grant of immunity. 
(15) Whether the declarant was a disinterested bystander or rather an in-
terested party. 
Id. (alteration in the original). 
248 Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 23.  The court also stated that the Confrontation Clause prohibits 
the use of corroborating evidence in criminal cases to determine the trustworthiness of 
statements offered unless the declarant testifies at trial.  Id. at 23-24.  This appears to be at 
odds with its decision three years earlier in Meeboer in which it held that that physical evi-
dence of sexual abuse could be considered to determine the trustworthiness of the child‘s 
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found the child‘s statements were trustworthy because they were 
spontaneous; there was no evidence to indicate that the child had a 
motive to fabricate, and he spoke in language that was appropriate for 
his age.249  The court also found that the child‘s statements to the so-
cial worker were more probative than his testimony at trial because 
there was less opportunity for him to be influenced by adults at the 
time of his interview with the social worker than by the time of the 
trial.250 
B. Children’s Hearsay Statements in Child Sexual 
Abuse Prosecution Cases Following Crawford v. 
Washington and Davis v. Washington 
The decision in Crawford dramatically altered the Court‘s 
Confrontation Clause jurisprudence and turned the law with respect 
to children‘s hearsay statements, particularly in cases of child sexual 
abuse, on its head.  Whereas after Roberts, the test for admissibility 
of these statements was whether they were inherently trustworthy or 
bore ―adequate indicia of reliability,‖251 after Crawford, courts are 
now required to determine if the hearsay statements were ―testimoni-
al.‖252  A statement is testimonial if it was ― ‗made under circums-
tances which would lead an objective witness reasonably to believe 
that the statement would be available for use at a later trial.‘ ‖253 
 
hearsay statements.  Meeboer, 484 N.W.2d at 627-28.  However, the court clarified this dis-
crepancy when it conditioned the consideration of this evidence on the declarant‘s testimony 
at trial.  Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 24.  Because the declarant testified in Meeboer, the holding in 
Katt did not overrule its previous one.  Id. 
  The defendant also argued that MICH. R. EVID. 803A (Michigan‘s version of a ―tender 
years‖ exception) ―covers the field‖ with respect to children‘s hearsay statements and that if 
the statements were not admissible under this rule, they are not admissible under the residual 
exception.  Id. at 15-16.  The court rejected this argument, noting that the majority of courts 
that have decided this issue have rejected this ―near miss‖ theory.  Id. at 20.  The court held 
that statements otherwise not admissible under one of the categorical exceptions to the hear-
say rule may, nonetheless, be admissible under the residual exception provided they meet the 
requirements of this rule.  Id. at 21-23.  In this case, the child‘s statements failed to meet the 
requirements of MICH. R. EVID. 803A because his statements to the social worker were not 
the first time that he raised his allegation of abuse, which is a requirement under Rule 803A.  
Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 25. 
249 Katt, 662 N.W.2d at 25. 
250 Id. 
251 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66. 
252 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68-69. 
253 Id. at 52 (quoting Brief for Nat‘l Ass‘n Criminal Def. Lawyers et. al. as Amici Curiae 
Supporting Petitioner, Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (No. 02-9410) at *3). 
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The objective witness test, with its focus on the declarant‘s 
perspective, has caused havoc in the courts with respect to children‘s 
hearsay statements.  In the intervening period after the Crawford de-
cision was handed down, but before the Court issued its opinion in 
Davis, courts questioned whether the objective witness test could ra-
tionally be applied to young children.254  There was much disagree-
ment over whether the reasonable person determination should be 
made from the perspective of a mature witness or whether the state-
ments should be viewed from a child‘s perspective.255 
Courts that have examined the statements from a ―reasonable 
child‘s‖ perspective have factored the child‘s age and cognitive abili-
ties into the determination of whether a ―reasonable child‖ would 
have understood the ramifications of his or her statements.256  For ex-
ample, in a case before the Colorado Supreme Court, in which a 
young child made statements to a physician in connection with a sex-
ual assault examination, the court held that the child‘s age was a 
―pertinent characteristic for analysis‖ in determining what an ―objec-
tively reasonable child‖ would comprehend.257  In addition to consi-
dering the child‘s age, the court also analyzed the circumstances sur-
rounding his statements.258  Based on this, the court found that an 
objective seven-year-old child in the victim‘s position would have in-
tended his statements to describe the source of his pain and symp-
toms; he would not have been able to comprehend that his statements 
would be used in a subsequent criminal trial.259 
 
254 Christopher Cannon Funk, The Reasonable Child Declarant After Davis v. Washing-
ton, 61 STAN. L. REV. 923, 936-38 (2009).  The author includes a lengthy presentation of 
cases that have addressed these issues.  Id. 
255 Id. 
256 Id. at 939, 958. 
257 People v. Vigil, 127 P.3d 916, 925-26 (Colo. 2006).  The court also reviewed whether 
the physician‘s interrogation of the child was the functional equivalent of a police interroga-
tion.  Id. at 922.  The court held that it was not since the doctor was not a government offi-
cial and, therefore the statements were not produced for the purpose of developing testimony 
for trial.  Id. at 924. 
258 Id. at 926. 
259 Id.  The court also found that the fact that the examination was conducted in the doc-
tor‘s offices with only the child, the doctor, and his mother present, lent further support to 
the conclusion that the child would not foresee his statements being used in a later trial.  Vi-
gil, 127 P.3d at 926; see also State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 255 (Minn. 2006) (com-
menting that it is doubtful that a three-year-old child would be capable of understanding that 
his statements would be used in a criminal prosecution); State v. Scacchetti, 690 N.W.2d 
393, 396 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that a three-year-old child‘s out-of-court statements 
to an examining physician would be testimonial only if the circumstances surrounding the 
making of the statements would lead a ―three-year-old to reasonably believe her disclosures 
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However, not all courts have agreed with the rationale 
adopted by the Colorado Court.  The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 
in State v. Snowden,260 held that ―an objective test, using an objective 
person, rather than an objective child of that age, is the appropriate 
test for determining whether a statement is testimonial in nature.‖261  
The American Prosecutors‘ Research Institute filed an amicus brief in 
the appeal of this case and argued that a young child‘s statements 
should never be testimonial given the ―limited cognitive and deve-
lopmental skills of young children.‖262  The court rejected this argu-
ment stating: 
Although we recognize that there may be situations 
where a child may be so young or immature that he or 
she would be unable to understand the testimonial na-
ture of his or her statements, we are unwilling to con-
clude that, as a matter of law, young children‘s state-
ments cannot possess the same testimonial nature as 
those of other, more clearly competent declarants.263 
The Snowden court expressed concern that the focus on the 
―testimonial capacity of young children overlooks the fundamental 
principles underlying the Confrontation Clause.‖264  It acknowledged 
that while there are valid public policy reasons for limiting a child 
victim‘s exposure to an emotionally disturbing courtroom experience, 
courts ―must be faithful to the Constitution‘s deep concern for the 
fundamental rights of the accused.‖265  The court found that the prop-
 
would be available for use at a later trial‖). 
260 867 A.2d 314, 329 (Md. 2005).  In this case, the trial court admitted the statements un-
der Maryland‘s ―tender years‖ statute.  Id. at 318-19.  The statute allowed the prosecution to 
introduce a health or social work professional‘s testimony as a substitute for that of a child 
if, inter alia, the trial court interviews the child in a closed hearing and makes a finding on 
the record that the child‘s statements possess ―specific guarantees of trustworthiness.‖  Id. at 
319; MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. PROC. § 11-304 (West 2001). 
261 Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329. 
262 Id. at 328. 
263 Id. at 328-29; see, e.g., People v. Mack, 101 P.3d 349 (Or. 2004) (involving a three 
year-old-declarant); People ex rel R.A.S., 111 P.3d 487, 488 (Colo. App. 2004) (involving a 
four-year-old declarant); People v. Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 753, 755-56 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2004) (involving an eight-year-old victim and a four-year-old victim). 
264 Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329. 
265 Id.  The court also noted that although the Supreme Court has recognized that the in-
terest of protecting victims may trump some rights protected by the Confrontation Clause, 
these interests may never prevail over the explicit guarantees of the Clause.  Id. (citing Coy 
v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1019-21 (1988)). 
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er test for determining when a statement is testimonial should not on-
ly take into account the intentions of the declarant, but should also 
look to the intentions of the person eliciting the statement.266  The 
court noted that to do otherwise would allow the prosecution to freely 
use statements by young children, which were made under circums-
tances in which the interrogators undoubtedly contemplated their use 
at a later trial.267 
The Maryland court‘s approach is the better reasoned one.  It 
is illogical to apply the Crawford test, which was formulated with 
adult declarants in mind to young children, who unlike Sylvia Craw-
ford, may for all intents and purposes be incapable of understanding 
the serious legal consequences that may occur as a result of their 
statements.268  Moreover, ascertaining what a child intended, requires 
a determination of what is ―artificial or unknowable.‖269  Further-
more, because it is easy for courts to reach the conclusion that a child 
is too young to form the necessary intent, it provides prosecutors a 
free pass to have these statements admitted, as the Maryland Court 
recognized.270 
The Supreme Court‘s decision in Davis altered the Crawford 
test by shifting the focus of the analysis from the objective intentions 
of the declarant to a ―primary purpose‖ test.271  Under this test, state-
ments are ―testimonial when the circumstances objectively indicate 
that there is no . . . ongoing emergency, and that the primary purpose 
of the interrogation is to establish or prove past events potentially re-
levant to later criminal prosecution.‖272  Further, under the primary 
purpose test, courts can consider not only the declarant‘s intent, but 
also the intentions of a ―reasonable listener.‖273 
In the period following the Davis decision, some courts have 
substituted the primary purpose test with the reasonable child test, but 
only in instances involving certain classes of listeners.274  The rea-
 
266 Id. (citing Crawford, 541 U.S. at 56 n.7). 
267 Id. at 329. 
268 See Mosteller, supra note 66, at 943 (stating that the children‘s explanations of the 
crime did not vary based on who they were speaking to, regardless of being in a testimonial 
or non-testimonial setting). 
269 Id. at 970. 
270 Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329. 
271 Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
272 Id. at 822. 
273 Id. at 827. 
274 Funk, supra note 254, at 940. 
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sonable child test continues to be applied in cases involving child-
ren‘s statements to parents, family members, caretakers, friends, and 
other private individuals.  With a few exceptions, courts have found 
these statements to be nontestimonial.275  The fact that children‘s 
statements to such individuals tend to be spontaneous may have led 
these courts to conclude that a reasonable child would not compre-
hend that his or her statements would be used at trial.276  Even so, the 
courts that have applied the primary purpose test from the perspective 
of the listener have reached the same conclusion that such statements 
are nontestimonial, but on the grounds that the parents were moti-
vated by the health and welfare of the child as opposed to a need to 
preserve evidence for use at a subsequent trial.277 
With respect to statements that children made to persons other 
than the individuals mentioned in the categories addressed above, 
courts have continued to consider the age and cognitive abilities of a 
child, but they have drawn a clear line when dealing with children‘s 
 
275 Id. at 942-43. 
276 Mosteller, supra note 66, at 944-45; see also State v. Brigman, 615 S.E.2d 21, 25 (N.C. 
App. 2005).  Brigman involved children‘s statements that were solicited by the foster mother 
after observing the children engaging in sexually oriented behavior.  Brigman, 615 S.E.2d at 
22.  Following a call to the state social service agency, she continued her questioning of the 
children.  Id.  She also attempted to tape record the statements.  Id.  The court found the 
children‘s statements to be nontestimonial because given the age of the children, they would 
not have anticipated that their statements would be used in a criminal trial.  Id. at 25-26.  
However, there are a few courts that have found this category of statements to raise Confron-
tation Clause concerns.  State v. Spencer, 169 P.3d 384, 389-90 (Mont. 2007); People v. 
Stechly, 870 N.E.2d 333, 345 (Ill. 2007); In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d 1029, 1030-31 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2005), vacated on other grounds, 863 N.E.2d 231 (Ill. 2006).  In one such case, the court 
found a child‘s statements to her grandmother to be testimonial because they were accusato-
ry in nature.  In re E.H., 823 N.E.2d at 1035-36.  The court stated: 
        Although some uncertainty remains regarding the exact definition 
of ―testimonial statements,‖ we are certain that, in this case, B.R.‘s 
statement to her grandmother falls within the purview of the ruling of 
Crawford and is governed by the protections of the confrontation clause.  
It is true that certain types of hearsay statements, i.e., ―an offhand, over-
heard remark,‖ may not qualify as statements at which the confrontation 
clause was directed, but it does apply against ―those who bear testimo-
ny.‖  Here, the declarant, B.R., bore accusatory testimony against E.H. 
which was offered to prove the truth of the matter asserted, specifically, 
that E.H. sexually assaulted her. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
Additionally, Justice Scalia‘s use of Brasier in his opinions in Davis and Bryant suggest that 
he would view the child‘s statements as raising Confrontation Clause concerns.  See Davis, 
547 U.S. at 828; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1173. 
277 Mosteller, supra note 66, at 947-48. 
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statements to law enforcement personnel.278  After Davis, the majori-
ty of courts that have applied the primary purpose test to children‘s 
statements to law enforcement personnel, have placed the focus of 
the analysis squarely on the intent of the questioner.279  Courts have 
also applied this approach even where the questioning was not con-
ducted by police officers, if they found that the questioning was the 
functional equivalent of a police interrogation.280  In determining 
whether questioning is the functional equivalent of a police interroga-
tion, courts consider the amount of law enforcement participation in 
the interview, specifically whether law enforcement personnel ap-
peared to direct or control the questioning.281 
In cases involving children‘s statements to physicians and 
counselors following the Davis decision, some courts, employing the 
primary purpose test, have concluded that the children‘s statements 
were nontestimonial on the grounds that the primary purpose of the 
interrogation was treatment or diagnosis.282  Other courts have 
reached opposite conclusions.283  More difficult questions are raised 
 
278 Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 359.  The court stated, ―We believe that [outside the context of 
police interrogation] the only proper focus is on the declarant‘s intent: Would the objective 
circumstances have led a reasonable person to conclude that their statement could be used 
against the defendant?‖  Id.  It also stated, ―[T]he better view is to treat the child‘s age as one 
of the objective circumstances to be taken into account in determining whether a reasonable 
person in his or her circumstances would have understood that their statement would be 
available for use at a later trial.‖  Id. at 363. 
279 Funk, supra note 254, at 940.  The Supreme Court of Illinois has noted: ―[W]hen the 
statements under consideration are the product of questioning by the police (or those whose 
‗acts [are] acts of the police‘), we must focus on the intent of the questioner in eliciting the 
statement.‖  Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 357 (alteration in the original). 
280 Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329-30. 
281 See Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 756-58; Mack, 101 P.3d at 352; In re Rolandis G., 902 
N.E.2d 600, 611 (Ill. 2008). 
282 See, e.g., Spencer, 169 P.3d at 388-90 (holding that statements by a three-year-old to 
her parent and licensed counselor were not testimonial because the primary purpose of the 
statements was parenting and counseling); Bush v. State, 193 P.3d 203, 209-10 (Wyo. 2008) 
(finding that the primary purpose of a young child‘s statements to a psychiatrist was diagno-
sis and treatment; therefore the statements were not testimonial). 
283 See, e.g., Snowden, 867 A.2d at 329-30.  The Maryland Court of Appeals found that 
although there might have been a therapeutic element to a child‘s interview with a social 
worker, this did not disguise the fact that interviews were designed to develop testimony that 
would likely be used at trial.  Id.  The court stated: 
Crawford’s command in this regard is clear.  No matter what other mo-
tives exist, if a statement is made under such circumstances that would 
lead an objective person to believe that statements made in response to 
government interrogation later would be used at trial, the admission of 
those statements must be conditioned upon Crawford’s requirements of 
unavailability and a prior opportunity to cross-examine.   
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in cases where the professionals involved have mixed motives or 
mixed intentions when questioning children. 
In recent years, state governments, encouraged by the De-
partment of Justice, have established multidisciplinary teams to re-
spond to the problems of child sexual abuse.284  These teams general-
ly consist of social workers, therapists, physicians, prosecutors, and 
police officers who perform dual roles.  These multidisciplinary 
teams have been successful in improving the skills of the individuals 
that interrogate children and in reducing the number of interviews 
that children are being subjected to.285  While there is little doubt that 
these practices serve important state interests, the statements pro-
cured as the result of these interviews face serious Confrontation 
Clause challenges. 
Courts have adopted a variety of approaches in determining 
the primary purpose of interrogations in cases involving children‘s 
statements procured under these types of circumstances.  Some courts 
have held that statements to non-government personnel are, by their 
very nature, nontestimonial.286  For example, in People v. Geno,287 
the defendant was convicted of sexually assaulting his girlfriend‘s 
two-year-old daughter.288  The child‘s father contacted Children‘s 
Protective Services after he noticed physical signs of sexual abuse.289  
The agency arranged for an assessment and interview of the child by 
the Children‘s Assessment Center.290  In response to questioning by 
the executive director of the Center as to whether the child ―had an 
owie,‖ pointing to her vaginal area, she answered, ―[Y]es, Dale [de-
 
Id. at 330. 
284 Raeder, supra note 1, at 381. 
285 John E.B. Myers et al., Psychological Research on Children as Witnesses: Practical 
Implications for Forensic Interviews and Courtroom Testimony, 28 PAC. L.J. 3, 17 (1996).  
Data has suggested that reducing the number of interviews that young children are subjected 
to eliminates stress and decreases the likelihood that suggestive questions will be directed at 
the child.  Id. 
286 See Vigil, 127 P.3d at 924 (holding that because the doctor was not a government offi-
cial, the statements were not produced for the purpose of developing testimony for trial). 
287 683 N.W.2d 687 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004). 
288 Id. at 689. 
289 Id. 
290 Id.  The Children‘s Assessment Center in Grand Rapids, Michigan indicates that it 
provides assessment services, forensic interviewing, law enforcement, Children‘s Protective 
Services, and noninvasive medical exams.  Children‘s Assessment Center, Hearing the Sto-
ry, CHILD. ASSESSMENT CTR., www.cac-kent.org/hearing_the_story.php (last visited Jan. 3, 
2012). 
42
Touro Law Review, Vol. 28 [2012], No. 1, Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol28/iss1/6
2012 SILENCING THE VICTIMS 127 
fendant] hurts me here.‖291  The trial court allowed the admission of 
the child‘s statements under the residual exception to the hearsay 
rule.292 
On review, the appellate court found that the child‘s state-
ments to the forensic interviewer were nontestimonial simply because 
they were made to a non-governmental employee.293  The court did 
not address the fact that the child identified her abuser in her state-
ments, it did not question the nature or purpose of the interrogation, 
nor did it discuss the fact that Children‘s Protection Services arranged 
for the assessment after the report of sexual abuse had been made.  It 
simply concluded: 
The child‘s statement was made to the executive direc-
tor of the Children‘s Assessment Center, not to a gov-
ernment employee, and the child‘s answer to the ques-
tion whether she had an ―owie‖ was not a statement in 
the nature of ―ex-parte in-court testimony or its func-
tional equivalent.‖294 
Other courts have found children‘s statements to be nontesti-
monial provided there was some evidence of a non-prosecutorial pur-
pose.295  The scant protection that confrontation rights can receive 
when courts strive to find a health and welfare purpose to the ques-
tioning, as distinct from a law enforcement purpose, is evidenced in 
the Minnesota Supreme Court‘s decision in State v. Bobadilla.296 
In Bobadilla, the court held that a child‘s videotaped state-
ment, given in response to questioning by a social worker, was non-
testimonial despite the fact that the interview was performed at the 
police department and in the presence of a police detective.297  The 
defendant argued that the statements were testimonial because the in-
terviews were conducted pursuant to a state statutory scheme that was 
created specifically for the purpose of investigating and responding to 
 
291 Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 689. 
292 Id. at 690.  Defendant did not raise a constitutional objection to the admissibility of this 
evidence at trial; hence, it was not properly preserved for appeal.  Id.  In light of this, the 
Court of Appeals reviewed his argument for plain error.  Id. 
293 Id. at 692. 
294 Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 692. 
295 See Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 237, at 310. 
296 709 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. 2006). 
297 Id. at 257. 
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child abuse and neglect.298  The court rejected this argument and in-
stead found that the principal purpose of the statutory scheme was to 
―protect the health and welfare of children.‖299  Three years later, the 
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in upholding a federal dis-
trict court‘s order granting a writ of habeas corpus to Bobadilla, 
found that the Minnesota Supreme Court ―unreasonably applied‖ the 
U.S. Supreme Court‘s holding in Crawford v. Washington.300  The 
Eighth Circuit found that the child‘s statements were testimonial be-
cause (1) the interviews were initiated by the police, (2) the purpose 
of the interview was to further the police investigation because the 
social worker conducted the questioning at the request of the police 
officer, and (3) the interview was not conducted until five days after 
the allegations of abuse were raised.301  The court concluded: 
[T]he interview . . . was initiated by a police officer to 
obtain statements for use during a criminal investiga-
tion, was recorded so further law enforcement inter-
views would be unnecessary, and involved structured 
questioning designed to confirm a prior allegation of 
abuse.  No one disputes [that if the detective] . . . con-
ducted the questioning, such statements would be tes-
timonial under Crawford.  It was unreasonable for the 
Minnesota Supreme Court to conclude just because 
[the detective] requested another government agent to 
ask the same questions in order to achieve the same 
purpose, the result is different.302 
Along the same lines, children‘s statements made during fo-
rensic interviews in sexual abuse clinics or advocacy centers have 
been found to be testimonial.303  In fact, the majority of jurisdictions 
that have ruled on this issue have found children‘s statements, made 
under these conditions, to be testimonial.304  The Supreme Court of 
 
298 Id. at 254. 
299 Id. 
300 Bobadilla v. Carlson, 575 F.3d 785, 793 (8th Cir. 2009). 
301 Id. at 791. 
302 Id. at 793. 
303 See, e.g., Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 333 (finding that a child‘s statements to a mandated 
reporter were testimonial); State v. Justus, 205 S.W.3d 872 (Mo. 2006) (finding that a child‘s 
statements to a state Child Protection Worker were testimonial); Mack, 101 P.3d at 349 
(finding that a child‘s statements to a state caseworker were testimonial). 
304 In re Rolandis G., 902 N.E.2d at 611. 
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Illinois, in In re Rolandis G.,305 held that statements made by a seven-
year-old to a child abuse investigator employed by a licensed advoca-
cy center were testimonial.306  In reaching its decision, the court re-
lied on the fact that the child advocate worked in concert with other 
agencies involved in the investigation and prosecution of child sexual 
abuse and was obligated, by statute, to share information with the po-
lice.307  The court stated: 
We are not unsympathetic to the State‘s concern that 
child abuse victims are often unavailable to testify be-
cause of their tender years and, for that reason, ―Craw-
ford is incompatible with the realities of child abuse 
prosecutions.‖  However, the Court in Davis, when 
faced with a similar argument in regard to victims of 
domestic violence, stated, ―We may not, however, vi-
tiate constitutional guarantees when they have the ef-
fect of allowing the guilty to go free.‖  Thus here, too, 
we may not abridge constitutional guarantees simply 
because they are a hindrance to the prosecution of 
child sexual abuse crimes.308 
More recently, in People v. Spangler,309 a Michigan court was 
asked to decide whether a young boy‘s statements, made to a Sexual 
Abuse Nurse Examiner (―SANE‖)310 who performed a forensic ex-
 
305 902 N.E.2d 600 (Ill. 2008). 
306 Id. at 613. 
307 Id. 
308 Id.  The court also found the following facts relevant: The defendant was not charged 
until after the interview with the child took place, and the police had retained a copy of the 
videotaped interview as evidence that the child was not in any danger from the defendant at 
the time of the interview.  Id.; see also Hernandez v. Florida, 946 So.2d 1270, 1282-83 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 2007) (finding that the questions of a nurse who was a member of a Child Pro-
tection Team at a hospital were the functional equivalent of a police interrogation); State v. 
Blue, 717 N.W.2d 558, 567 (N.D. 2006) (finding that a child‘s videotaped interview with a 
forensic interviewer at the Child Advocacy Center was testimonial); Sisavath, 13 Cal. Rptr. 
3d at 758 (finding that a child victim‘s videotaped interview at the county facility designed 
and staffed for interviewing children victims of sexual abuse was testimonial); Contreras v. 
State, 910 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005) (holding testimonial a videotaped 
statement given by a thirteen-year-old to a coordinator of the state‘s child protection team 
where a sheriff was connected electronically in another room). 
309 774 N.W.2d 702 (Mich. Ct. App. 2009). 
310 SANE – Sexual Assault Nurse Examiner, ALLNURSES, http://allnurses.com/forensic-
nursing/sexual-assault-nurse-152900.html (last updated May 8, 2007, 8:39 AM).  The role of 
the SANE includes the following functions: ―Perform a physical examination on the victim, 
[c]ollect evidence, [t]reat minor injuries such as cuts/bruises, [e]xpert testimony regarding 
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amination, were testimonial.311  The court engaged in a lengthy dis-
cussion of decisions rendered by courts in other states and noted that 
the majority of courts have found statements made under these types 
of circumstances to be testimonial.312  The court presented a series of 
factors that other courts have considered important in making this de-
termination.313  However, the court ultimately found that the record 
was insufficiently developed to allow it to make the necessary find-
ings.314  It remanded the case to the trial court with instructions to de-






the forensic evidence collected, [s]erve on a SANE response team (SART), [w]ork closely 
with law enforcement agencies and the prosecutor‘s office, [s]upport the psychological needs 
of the victim.‖  Id. 
311 Spangler, 774 N.W.2d at 704. 
312 Id. at 709-12. 
313 Id. at 713.  The factors are: 
(1) The reason for the victim‘s presentation to the SANE, e.g., to be 
checked for injuries or for signs of abuse; (2) the length of time between 
the abuse and the presentation; (3) what, if any, preliminary questions 
were asked of the victim or the victim‘s representative, or what prelimi-
nary conversations took place, before the official interview or examina-
tion; (4) where the interview or examination took place, e.g., a hospital 
emergency room, another location in the hospital, or an off-site location; 
(5) the manner in which the interview or examination was conducted; (6) 
whether the SANE conducted a medical examination and, if so, the ex-
tent of the examination and whether the SANE provided or recommend-
ed any medical treatment; (7) whether the SANE took photographs or 
collected any other evidence; (8) whether the victim‘s statements were 
offered spontaneously, or in response to particular questions, and at what 
point during the interview or examination the statements were made; (9) 
whether the SANE completed a forensic form during or after the inter-
view or examination; (10) whether the victim or the victim‘s representa-
tive signed release or authorization forms, or was privy to any portion of 
the forensic form, before or during the interview or examination; (11) 
whether individuals other than the victim and the SANE were involved 
in the interview or examination and, if so, the level of their involvement; 
(12) if and when law enforcement became involved in the case, how they 
became involved and the level of their involvement; and (13) how 
SANEs are used by the particular hospital or facility where the interview 
or examination took place. 
Id. 
314 Id. at 714. 
315 Spangler, 774 N.W.2d at 714. 
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V. THE IMPACT OF MICHIGAN V. BRYANT ON THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF CHILDREN’S HEARSAY 
STATEMENTS IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 
PROSECUTIONS 
A. The Significant Portions of the Bryant Opinion 
Bryant affirmed the primary purpose test that the Court set out 
in Davis along with its holding that statements are testimonial when 
the ―primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove past 
events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.‖316  The fac-
tors that are important to the determination of the primary purpose of 
an interrogation are the intentions of the declarant and the listener, 
the circumstances surrounding the interrogation including whether 
the statements were made during an ongoing emergency, and the role 
of the interrogator.317 
The Bryant Court affirmed the Davis Court‘s requirement that 
courts apply an objective standard in determining whether statements 
are testimonial.318  In determining the primary purpose of an interro-
gation, courts should ascertain ―the purpose that reasonable partici-
pants would have had, as ascertained from the individuals‘ statements 
and actions and the circumstances in which the encounter oc-
curred.‖319  However, the Bryant Court changes from whose perspec-
tive this objective standard is applied.  While Crawford placed the 
focus of the inquiry squarely on the declarant and Davis suggested 
instances where it might be appropriate for courts to examine the in-
tentions of the interrogators, Bryant appears to require that the inter-
rogator‘s intent become a key element in the analysis.320  Moreover, it 
seems to consider the interrogator‘s intent to be paramount in situa-
tions where the declarant is operating under a disability, such as the 
gunshot victim in Bryant.321 
The Bryant decision also altered the concept of what can con-
stitute an ongoing emergency.  It suggested that the duration of an 
ongoing emergency can be quite long in cases involving guns and 
 
316 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1154. 
317 Id. at 1156-57. 
318 Id. at 1156. 
319 Id. 
320 Id. at 1160-62. 
321 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158-59. 
47
Paruch: Silencing the Victims
Published by Digital Commons @ Touro Law Center, 2012
132 TOURO LAW REVIEW Vol. 28 
any possible, albeit negligible, threat to the public at large.322  Fur-
ther, it clearly indicated that the duration of emergencies in domestic 
violence cases will oftentimes be relatively short because they in-
volve a known perpetrator and have a ―narrower zone of potential 
victims than cases involving threats to public safety.‖323  It also sug-
gested that an emergency ends when the perpetrator flees the scene of 
the crime with little prospect of posing a threat to the public.324 
With respect to the role of the interrogator in determining 
whether a declarant‘s statements are testimonial, Crawford, Davis, 
and Bryant all dealt with interrogations by law enforcement person-
nel, albeit under three distinct sets of circumstances.325  Whereas, 
Crawford did not shut out the possibility that statements made out-
side the context of a police interrogation could be testimonial,326 Da-
vis explicitly reserved for another time the question of ―whether and 
when statements made to someone other than law enforcement per-
sonnel are testimonial.‖327  However, the Court in Bryant clearly took 
the position that the determination of whether a statement is testi-
monial is not limited to interrogations by law enforcement personal 
when it stated that ―the most important instances in which the Clause 
restricts the introduction of out-of-court statements are those in which 
state actors are involved in a formal, out-of-court interrogation of a 
witness to obtain evidence for trial.‖328 
Finally, in what is the most disconcerting feature of the 
Bryant opinion, the Court appeared to reintroduce the concept of re-
liability into its Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.329  Without ex-
planation, it stated that ―standard rules of hearsay, designed to identi-
fy some statements as reliable, will be relevant‖ in determining the 
primary purpose of an interrogation.330  However, it provided no 
guidance as to how this rule should be interpreted or applied, nor did 
 
322 Id. at 1164.  
323 Id. at 1158. 
324 Id. at 1159. 
325 Id. (involving interrogations of a gunshot victim by police officers in a gas station 
parking lot); Davis, 547 U.S. 813 (involving a 911 call and police interrogations of domestic 
violence victims in their homes); Crawford, 541 U.S. 36 (involving police interrogations of 
defendant‘s spouse while she was in police custody). 
326 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68. 
327 Davis, 547 U.S. at 823 n.2. 
328 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (emphasis added). 
329 Id. at 1174 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
330 Id. at 1155 (majority opinion). 
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it explain how the reliability of hearsay statements is relevant to the 
determination of the purpose of an interrogation. 
B. The Admissibility of Children’s Hearsay 
Statements in Criminal Sexual Abuse Prosecutions 
After Michigan v. Bryant 
The U.S. Supreme Court‘s decision in Bryant significantly 
impacts the admissibility of children‘s out of court statements in that 
it increases the likelihood that the statements will be found to be tes-
timonial, thereby decreasing the likelihood that they will be admitted 
in criminal prosecutions.  First, because of the Court‘s choice of the 
phrase ―state actors,‖331 courts should no longer be able to find that 
statements are nontestimonial solely on the grounds that they were 
not made to law enforcement or government employees.  Second, af-
ter Bryant, courts should be less likely to find that children‘s state-
ments reporting sexual abuse are made during ongoing emergencies.  
Lastly, the shift in focus from the declarant‘s intent to that of the in-
terrogator, particularly in situations where the declarant is found to be 
operating under a disability,332 should result in an increased number 
of children‘s hearsay statements being found to be testimonial. 
1. Mandatory Reporters Are State Actors and 
Should Be Included in the Category of 
Individuals to Whom Testimonial Statements 
Can Be Made 
The Bryant Court indicated that a statement would be testi-
monial if made in situations ―in which state actors are involved in a 
formal, out-of-court interrogation of a witness to obtain evidence for 
trial.‖333  The Court‘s use of the phrase ―state actors‖ is worthy of 
note.334  It implies that the category of persons to whom testimonial 
 
331 See id. at 1155. 
332 Id. at 1161-62.  What is uncertain is the effect that the Court‘s references to reliability 
will have.  Although it indicated that well-established hearsay exceptions could be consi-
dered in determining the primary purpose of an interrogation, how this should happen re-
mains unclear. 
333 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155 (emphasis added). 
334 Id.  It might be argued after Bryant that the Court‘s use of the phrase ―state actor‖ im-
plies that statements made to parents, siblings or other family members or friends might not 
be testimonial because these individuals would ordinarily not fall into the category of ―state 
actor.‖  Id.  However, the Court indicated that state actors would be involved in the ―most 
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statements can be made is not limited to government employees, as 
some courts have held.335 
A private person can be a state actor pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 
1983336 when there is a ―sufficiently close nexus between the State 
and the challenged action of the [private person] so that the action of 
the latter may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.‖337  This can 
occur in cases in which a particular activity has been specifically au-
thorized or sufficiently encouraged by the state.338  The U.S. Supreme 
 
important instances‖ in which testimonial statements might be made.  Id.  Therefore it did 
not exclude parents or other family members.  Id. 
335 See Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 692; Vigil, 127 P.3d at 923-24 (holding that a doctor, absent 
direct and controlling police presence, is not acting as an agent for the government when 
questioning a child victim during a medical examination). 
336 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (allowing a cause of action against persons who act ―under color 
of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory‖).  It pro-
vides: 
        Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom or usage, of any state or Territory or the District of Columbia, 
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any 
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
Id. 
337 Jackson v. Metro. Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 351 (1974) (citing Moose Lodge No. 107 
v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 176 (1972)) (addressing the circumstances under which a private per-
son has acted ―under color of law‖).  Legal scholars have noted three general theories under 
which ―courts have found a sufficient nexus to support state action: the public function test; 
the government ‗entanglement‘ theory; and cases where there has been specific authorization 
or [sufficient] encouragement‖ by the state of the particular activity.  Sheila S. Kennedy, 
When is Private Public? State Action in the Era of Privatization and Public-Private Partner-
ships, 11 GEO. MASON U. C.R. L. J. 203, 210 (2001).  Others have viewed the state-action 
inquiry as being composed of two competing models.  John Dorsett Niles et al., Making 
Sense of State Action, 51 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 885, 897 (2011) (citing G. Sidney Bucha-
nan, A Conceptual History of the State Action Doctrine: The Search for Governmental Re-
sponsibility, 34 HOUS. L. REV. 333, 356 (1997)).  Under the first model, referred to as the 
―characterization model,‖ a court examines whether the conduct of the private actor can be 
reasonably characterized as action by the state.  Buchanan, supra.  This question is generally 
resolved through the nexus or public function test.  Niles et al., supra.  Under this test, state 
action will be found when the private actor performs ―activities or functions which are tradi-
tionally associated with sovereign governments, and which are operated almost exclusively 
by governmental entities.‖  2 Ronald D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, TREATISE ON 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE 1010 (4th ed. 2007); see also Marsh v. 
Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946) (finding state action by the actions of a company in 
owning and running a town on the grounds that this was a function traditionally and exclu-
sively undertaken by the state); Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 469 (1953) (ruling that hold-
ing an election for a candidate for public office is a function traditionally reserved to the 
state). 
338 See, e.g., Peterson v. Greenville, 373 U.S. 244, 247-48 (1963).  This includes instances 
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Court explained this principle in Rendell-Baker v. Kohn339: ―[A] State 
normally can be held responsible for a private decision when it has 
exercised coercive power or has provided such significant encou-
ragement, either overt or covert, that the choice must in law be 
deemed to be that of the State.‖340  Importantly, when the government 
mandates certain actions, through inter alia, legislation or administra-
tive rules and regulations, a private person‘s compliance with these 
requirements is state action.341  In Peterson v. City of Greenville,342 
the Court found that actions by restaurant owners who discriminated 
against their customers based on race was state action because exist-
ing state legislation commanded that restaurants serve food on a ra-
cially segregated basis.343  Furthermore, in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & 
Co.,344 the Court stated: ―[A] State is responsible for the . . . act[s] of 
a private party when the State, by its law, has compelled the act.‖345 
Individuals who are required to report suspected cases of 
child abuse or neglect under state mandatory reporting statutes should 
be included in the category of individuals to whom testimonial state-
ments can be made, because they would likely be considered state ac-
tors under prevailing civil rights litigation jurisprudence.346  Every 
state has laws mandating reporting of suspected child abuse or neg-
lect.347  These statutes identify the category of professionals that are 
required to report suspected abuse or neglect and the procedures to be 
 
when the state takes affirmative steps to encourage or compel interaction between private 
actors and the government.  Id.  In this model, termed the ―state authorization‖ model, the 
court‘s inquiry focuses on the extent to which the state has authorized a private actor‘s beha-
vior by ―placing the private actor in a position where the actor may ‗gouge‘ the challenger 
with legal impunity.‖  Niles et al., supra note 337, at 897. 
339 457 U.S. 830 (1982). 
340 Id. at 840 (quoting Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982)). 
341 Rotunda & Nowak, supra note 337, at 1010; see, e.g., Peterson, 373 U.S. at 247-48. 
342 373 U.S. 244 (1963). 
343 Id. at 247-48; see, e.g., Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982) (applying 
these principles).  In Lugar, the Court held that a debtor could bring a § 1983 action chal-
lenging, on procedural due process grounds, a state procedure that allowed a creditor to se-
cure an ex parte writ of attachment against the debtor‘s property.  Id. at 941.  The Court 
found that the joint actions of the sheriff and the creditor, acting pursuant to a state statute, 
constituted state action.  Id. at 935.  It explained that a private party can be a state actor when 
―he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his 
conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State.‖  Id. at 937. 
344 398 U.S. 144 (1970). 
345 Id. at 170. 
346 See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) (defining a state actor for purposes of civil rights claims). 
347 Raeder, supra note 1, at 313. 
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followed.348  For instance, Michigan‘s mandatory reporting statute 
provides in pertinent part: 
        A physician, dentist, . . . nurse, . . . psychologist,  
. . . social worker, . . . school counselor or teacher, . . . 
member of the clergy, or regulated child care provider 
who has reasonable cause to suspect child abuse or 
neglect shall make immediately, by telephone or oth-
erwise, an oral report, or cause an oral report to be 
made, of the suspected child abuse or neglect to the 
department.  Within 72 hours after making the oral re-
port, the reporting person shall file a written report as 
required in this act.349 
Prior to the Bryant decision, some courts were hesitant to find 
that statements made to mandated reporters were testimonial.  In a 
case involving statements of abuse by a young boy to a physician, the 
California Supreme Court rejected the defendant‘s argument that the 
statements were testimonial even though the physician was obligated 
by statute to report the abuse.350  The court stated: ―The mere fact that 
doctors must report abuse they see, suspect or know of in the course 
of practice does not transform them into investigative agents of law 
enforcement.‖351 
 
348 Id. at 374.  The information that must be reported to the child protection agency is also 
set forth in the statute which provides: 
        The written report shall contain the name of the child and a descrip-
tion of the abuse or neglect.  If possible, the report shall contain the 
names and addresses of the child‘s parents, the child‘s guardian, the per-
sons with whom the child resides, and the child‘s age.  The report shall 
contain other information available to the reporting person that might es-
tablish the cause of the abuse of neglect, and the manner in which the 
abuse or neglect occurred. 
M.C.L. § 722.623(1)(c)(2) (2011). 
349 Id. §722.623(1)(a).  The full list of mandated reporters includes: ―physician[s], dent-
ist[s], physician‘s assistant[s], registered dental hygienist[s], medical examiner[s], nurse[s], 
person[s] licensed to provide emergency medical care, audiologist[s], psychologist[s], mar-
riage and family therapist[s], licensed professional counselor[s], social worker[s], licensed 
master‘s social worker[s], licensed bachelor‘s social worker[s], registered social service 
technician[s], social service technician[s], person[s] employed in a professional capacity in 
any office of the friend of the court, school administrator[s], school counselor[s] or teach-
er[s], law enforcement officer[s], member[s] of the clergy, or regulated child care provider[s] 
. . . .‖  Id. 
350 People v. Cage, 155 P.3d 205, 218-20 (Cal. 2007). 
351 Id. at 220.  One author has argued that, although physicians are mandated reporters in 
most jurisdictions, any statements made to them should not be testimonial because physi-
52
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Not all courts have agreed with the California court.  The Su-
preme Court of Illinois held that a child‘s statements describing sex-
ual abuse that were made to the nurse in charge of a child-abuse team 
at a local hospital and to a social worker at her school were testi-
monial.352  It supported its conclusion by the fact that both of these 
individuals were mandated reporters and therefore had a legal obliga-
tion under penalty of criminal law to report information to the child 
protection agency.353  The court stated: 
        [B]y virtue of their status as mandated reporters 
both [individuals] . . . were legally required to report 
to the Department and then to testify, and the Depart-
ment itself was also required to cooperate with law en-
forcement.354  These facts substantially buttress our 
conclusion that in this case, in conducting their inter-
views of the victim, . . . [they] were acting as agents of 
law enforcement for purposes of confrontation clause 
analysis.355 
The Bryant Court‘s use of the term ―state actor‖ suggests that 
the cases in which courts have found children‘s statements to manda-
 
cians can never be considered to be agents of the government.  Tom Harbinson, Crawford v. 
Washington and Davis v. Washington‘s Originalism: Historical Arguments Showing Child 
Abuse Victims’ Statements to Physicians are Nontestimonial and Admissible as an Exception 
to the Confrontation Clause, 58 MERCER L. REV. 569, 616-17 (2007).  The author argues that 
physicians are not agents of the government because agency law requires a free choice on 
the part of the agent in entering into the relationship with the principal, which is not present 
in the case of mandatory reporting.  Id. at 616-17.  Additionally, a physician‘s ethical duty 
requires that he act on behalf of the best interests of his patient and not on the part of the 
government, which would be required by agency law.  Id. at 618.  Finally, there is no agree-
ment between mandated reporters and the state nor is the physician under the control of the 
government, two principles that are required under agency law.  Id.  The author also argued 
that the fact that the interview is videotaped should not make statements testimonial.  Id. at 
629.  He suggests that the purpose is simply to ―memorialize[e] the child‘s statements,‖ and 
―allow[] the child‘s demeanor to be recorded on videotape.‖  Harbinson, supra at 628.  How-
ever, he does not explain why a physician would be interested in preserving a record of the 
child‘s demeanor, if not for potential use at subsequent criminal proceedings. 
352 Stechly, 870 N.E.2d at 363-65.  In this case, her mother took the child to a hospital, 
where she was interviewed by a nurse and subsequently examined by a physician.  Id. at 339.  
The school social worker interviewed the child the following day, after receiving a call from 
the child‘s mother.  Id. at 339-40; see also State v. Hosty, 944 So. 2d 255 (Fla. 2006) (Pa-
riente, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discussing the fact that a teacher had a 
duty to report a child‘s statement to law enforcement personnel as a pertinent factor in de-
termining whether the statements were testimonial). 
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tory reporters to be testimonial were correctly decided.  Under the 
prevailing mandated reporting statutes, it is clear that states have 
commanded particular action from specifically named individuals.  
States require these named individuals to file reports of suspected 
cases of child abuse and neglect with law enforcement authorities.356  
These statutes also prescribe criminal sanctions for failure to comp-
ly.357  Therefore, the actions of these private persons, in reporting 
suspected cases of child abuse and neglect pursuant to these statutes, 
are state action and the individuals involved are state actors.358  Fol-
lowing Bryant, courts should no longer be able to conclude that 
statements made to this category of individuals are nontestimonial on 
the grounds that they are not made to governmental employees. 
2. The Primary Purpose Test: The Scope of an 
Ongoing Emergency 
The Court‘s discussion of the factors that demonstrate an on-
going emergency, particularly the manner in which it distinguished 
the circumstances in Bryant from those in Davis, will have a signifi-
cant impact on the admissibility of children‘s statements in future 
criminal prosecutions.  The Court clearly stated that the duration of 
an emergency in cases of domestic violence is far shorter than in oth-
er types of crimes.359  It is significant that the Court emphasized that 
domestic violence cases have a narrower zone of potential victims 
than those presented in Bryant; it is also significant that the Court 
emphasized the fact that in both Davis and Hammon the perpetrator 
was known to the victim.360  And it is noteworthy that in Hammon, 
the Court found that the threat was neutralized once law enforcement 
personnel arrived on the scene.361  Lastly, the Court‘s comments that 
an emergency would end once the perpetrator flees the scene of the 
 
356 M.C.L. § 722.623 (2011). 
357 M.C.L. § 722.633 (2011). 
358 Kia P. v. McIntyre, 235 F.3d 749, 756-57 (2d Cir. 2000).  Further, it is likely that legis-
latures contemplated this result when they provided a grant of immunity to persons acting in 
conformity with the reporting statutes.  See, e.g., M.C.L. § 722.625 (providing immunity 
from civil or criminal liability for any ―person acting in good faith who makes a report, coo-
perates in an investigation, or assists in any other requirement of this act . . . .  A person 
making a report or assisting in any other requirement of this act is presumed to have acted in 
good faith‖). 
359 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158. 
360 Id.; Davis, 547 U.S. at 832-33. 
361 Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30; Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1158. 
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crime with little prospect of posing a threat to the public will prove to 
be quite important for future cases to come because any statement 
made after this point could be considered testimonial.362 
If this reasoning is applied to child sexual abuse cases (and it 
is likely that it will be given the analogous nature of domestic vi-
olence and sexual abuse crimes), the effect will be to significantly 
limit the time frame during which children‘s statements can be found 
to be nontestimonial.  Prior to Bryant, some courts found that an on-
going emergency existed at the time a young child was taken to a 
hospital for an examination following reports of sexual abuse.363  
However, this finding will no longer align with the Bryant decision.  
The perpetrator in a child sexual abuse case is more analogous to a 
batterer in domestic violence cases than the armed gunman in Bryant.  
In child sexual abuse cases, the perpetrator is generally known to the 
victim since the vast majority of children are sexually abused by fam-
ily members or friends.364  Additionally, like the perpetrators in 
Hammon and Davis, the perpetrator in a child sexual abuse case gen-
erally does not present a threat to the public at large. 
Furthermore, although some courts found an ongoing emer-
gency in child sexual abuse cases when the perpetrator continued to 
live in the same household as the child,365 going forward, these con-
clusions will also be difficult to square with the Bryant decision.  In 
analyzing the span of the emergency in Davis, the Bryant Court never 
considered the very real possibility that an abusive partner is likely to 
repeat his actions in the very near future.  In reviewing Hammon, the 
Court found that the emergency had ended even though the husband 
never left the home.366  Moreover, the Bryant Court commented that 
since the husband in Hammon was ―armed only with his fists when he 
attacked his wife, . . . removing [her] to a separate room was suffi-
cient to end the emergency.‖367  By analogy, in child sexual abuse 
cases, removing the child victim from the physical presence of the 
perpetrator would also end the emergency because, like the abusive 
spouse in Hammon, a child molester is generally ―armed only with‖ 
 
362 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159; Davis, 547 U.S. at 828. 
363 See Seely v. State, 282 S.W.3d 778, 789-90 (Ark. 2008); State v. Krasky, 736 N.W.2d 
636, 641-42 (Minn. 2007). 
364 Burch v. Millas, 663 F. Supp. 2d 151, 169 (W.D.N.Y. 2009). 
365 Id. 
366 Davis, 547 U.S. at 829-30. 
367 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159 (emphasis added). 
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his physical anatomy. 
3. The Primary Purpose Test: Considering the 
Interrogator’s Intentions 
The Bryant Court stated that in determining the primary pur-
pose of an interrogation, courts should ascertain ―the purpose that 
reasonable participants would have had, as ascertained from the indi-
viduals‘ statements and actions and the circumstances in which the 
encounter occurred.‖368  Following Crawford, yet before the decision 
of Bryant, with the focus of a court‘s inquiry centered on the intent of 
the declarant, many courts felt free to find that children‘s statements 
were nontestimonial on the grounds that a ―reasonable child‖ would 
be unable to comprehend that his or her statements may be used in a 
subsequent criminal trial.369  Thus, Bryant has shifted the focus to 
consider the interrogator‘s intent especially in situations where the 
declarant is operating under a disability.  Therefore, resolution of 
whether a young child‘s out-of-court statements are testimonial will 
require a court to focus on the interrogator‘s intent.  Because of this, 
Bryant may also change the manner in which courts resolve cases in 
which professionals who perform dual functions interrogate children.  
For example, physicians perform dual roles in cases involving the 
sexual abuse of children.  They provide medical care, but because 
they are mandated reporters, they also serve as investigators for the 
state.370  In Michigan, physicians are required to report ―information 
available to the reporting person that might establish the cause of the 
abuse or neglect, and the manner in which the abuse or neglect oc-
curred.‖371  These reporting requirements necessitate that physicians 
perform investigatory functions, particularly with respect to the man-
ner in which the abuse occurred, which include obtaining information 
about the identity of the perpetrator and reporting this information to 
state authorities. 
Professor Robert Mosteller has commented that cases such as 
these, in which the professionals have mixed motives and intentions, 
―present[ ] a key test of whether the testimonial statement system has 
 
368 Id. at 1156. 
369 Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926. 
370 State v. Goins, No. CA2000-09-190, 2001 WL 1525298, at *6 (Ohio Ct. App. Dec. 3, 
2001). 
371 M.C.L. § 722.623(1)(c)(2). 
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substance or only requires a precise articulation of another acceptable 
purpose as an avoidance strategy.‖372  Courts that found a nontesti-
monial purpose for interrogations in situations where the professional 
had mixed motives appear to have done so in an effort to achieve the 
desired result from a policy perspective.373  However, in doing so, 
these courts have produced opinions in which the law has been 
stretched beyond its rational boundaries.374 
In these types of cases, it is not necessary for courts to find 
only one purpose behind an interrogation.  Both Bryant and Davis 
have recognized, at least with respect to ongoing emergencies, that 
conversations that originate as an interrogation, whose main purpose 
is to determine the need for emergency assistance, can develop into 
testimonial statements.375  The same reasoning should apply to situa-
tions where an interrogator has mixed motives and intentions.  For 
example, questioning by a physician that begins with the need to ob-
tain information from the child that is necessary for medical diagno-
sis or treatment can transform into testimonial statements.  The inter-
rogation becomes prosecutorial in nature once the medical status is 
properly assessed.  At this point, the purpose of any additional ques-
tioning shifts to ascertaining fault, particularly when the questions are 
designed to elicit the identity of the perpetrator.  In these cases, child-
ren‘s statements identifying their abusers should be considered to be 
testimonial.376  The physician is a state actor, the circumstances under 
which the statements are elicited are not likely to be considered an 
ongoing emergency, and by inquiring into the identity of the perpe-
trator, the physician is engaging in the role of a state investigator.  
Moreover, the physician has reason to know that the information he 
or she obtains and reports to the law enforcement authorities will 
likely be used at a subsequent trial. 
Even more compelling arguments can be made that children‘s 
statements obtained in response to questioning by SANEs or mem-
bers of multidisciplinary teams that operate in hospitals and specia-
 
372 Mosteller, supra note 66, at 974. 
373 Id. at 970-75 (noting that some courts that have found a nontestimonial purpose behind 
interrogations of children have based their decision on finding that the questioning was mo-
tivated by concerns for the health and welfare of the child). 
374 Geno, 683 N.W.2d at 692 (concluding that the child‘s statement to the executive direc-
tor of a forensic center was not testimonial simply because the director was not a govern-
mental employee). 
375 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1159. 
376 Vigil, 127 P.3d at 926. 
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lized clinics should be considered testimonial.  Not only are these 
professionals state actors but they are frequently so closely aligned 
with law enforcement as to be considered an arm of law enforcement.  
For example, one agency reports on its website that it engages in fo-
rensic interviewing conducted with other ―team members‖ observing 
the interview via a one-way glass, and that it has three city police of-
ficers; two sheriff detectives; and four state child protection workers 
housed at its facilities.377  It also reports that a pediatrician at the 
agency performs physical exams and collects evidence in cases of 
sexual abuse.378 
Likewise after Bryant, children‘s statements reporting sexual 
abuse made to employees of a state‘s child protection agency should 
be found to be testimonial.  It is routine practice for investigators em-
ployed by a state‘s child protection agency to question young child-
ren after the agency has received a report of suspected abuse.379  In 
these situations, the child protection worker is a state actor, and al-
though concerns for the child‘s welfare will have prompted the inves-
tigation, there is no doubt that there is also a prosecutorial purpose to 
the questioning.  In fact, the child protection agency is normally re-
quired to forward a copy of its investigation report to law enforce-
ment in cases of child sexual abuse and to continue to work in tan-
dem with the police departments and the county prosecutor‘s 
office.380 
In determining whether children‘s statements are testimonial, 
when they are made in situations in which the interrogators have 
mixed motives and intentions, the inquiry test should not focus on 
whether there is some accompanying, nontestimonial reason for the 
interrogation.  Rather, the inquiry should focus on the investigative 
role that these persons are performing and whether they have reason 
to know that the information they obtain and report to law enforce-
ment will likely be used in a subsequent criminal trial. 
 
377 Children‘s Assessment Center, Hearing the Story, CHILD. ASSESSMENT CTR., 
www.cac-kent.org/hearing_the_story.php (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
378 Id. 
379 The Statewide Central Register of Child Abuse and Maltreatment, CHILD PROTECTIVE 
SERVS., http://www.ocfs.state.ny.us/main/cps/ (last visited Jan. 4, 2012). 
380 See, e.g., M.C.L. § 722.623(c)(6). 
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C. Recommendations 
The testimonial approach to Confrontation Clause jurispru-
dence has been criticized as being ―intellectually and ethically bank-
rupt,‖381 particularly as it relates to children‘s hearsay statements.  
Professor Eileen Scallen has commented that under the current state 
of the law, out-of-court statements made by ―hysterical, unavailable 
declarants whose ability to perceive, recall, and communicate key 
facts is questionable‖ are admissible in criminal trials.382  Yet, ironi-
cally, videotaped interviews of children that are conducted by trained 
investigators ―questioning a vulnerable child witness whose memory 
will only likely deteriorate with time‖ will likely be excluded.383  
There is certainly much truth to Professor Scallen‘s statements.  Non-
etheless, if the Confrontation Clause is to be accorded its due respect, 
courts must require what the Clause demands: ―[that] the accused 
shall enjoy the right to . . . be confronted with the witnesses against 
him . . . .‖384 
Unfortunately, issues of competency often arise when young 
children are called as witnesses, which can prevent them from testify-
ing at trial.385  Courts require a witness to be capable of discerning 
truth from lies, willing and able to swear an oath or make some other 
promise that he or she will testify truthfully, and capable of speaking 
about the facts at issue.386  Although there is a rebuttable presumption 
in Federal Rule of Evidence 601 that everyone is competent to testi-
fy,387 research suggests that some courts are hesitant to find children 
competent to testify.388 
Not only do courts differ in their positions on whether child-
ren are competent enough to testify under evidentiary rules, but they 
also take different positions on what is required to constitute suffi-
cient cross-examination to satisfy the Confrontation Clause.  The 
 
381 Eileen A. Scallen, Coping with Crawford: Confrontation of Children and Other Chal-
lenging Witnesses, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1558, 1607 (2009). 
382 Id. 
383 Id. 
384 U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
385 See Aviva A. Orenstein, Children as Witnesses: A Symposium on Child Competence 
and the Accused’s Right to Confront Child Witnesses, 82 IND. L. J. 909 (2007). 
386 Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 741 (1987). 
387 FED R. EVID. 601 (providing that witnesses are competent ―except as otherwise pro-
vided‖). 
388 Scallen, supra note 381, at 1586 (citing Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Young 
Maltreated Children’s Competence to Take the Oath, 3 APPLIED DEV. SCI. 16, 16-27 (1999)). 
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Eighth Circuit has held that if a child is too young to be cross-
examined or if she is too young or frightened to be subjected to a tho-
rough cross-examination, ―the fact that she is physically present in 
the courtroom should not, in and of itself, satisfy the demands of the 
Clause.‖389  On the other hand, the U.S. Supreme Court has set a low 
threshold for determining a witness‘ availability for cross-
examination purposes.390  In United States v. Owens,391 the Court held 
that a witness is available for, and hence subject to cross-examination 
for Confrontation Clause purposes, when he takes the stand, swears 
an oath, and responds willingly to questions, although he may have 
no memory of the events to which he was called to testify.392  The 
Court stated that ―the Confrontation Clause guarantees only ‗an op-
portunity for effective cross-examination, not cross-examination that 
is effective in whatever way, and to whatever extent, the defense 
might wish.‘ ‖393 
In response to the hesitancy of some courts to find children 
competent to testify, scholars have appealed to these courts to be 
flexible in their approach to child witnesses.394  Professors Thomas 
Lyon and Karen Saywitz from U.C.L.A. Medical Center have sug-
gested that judges and advocates have inadvertently ―skew[ed] the 
competency hearing results by the [manner in which] they frame the 
questions‖ to young children.395  They have created alternative com-
petency assessment tools for courts to employ that they believe will 
improve the competency determinations of young children.396  These 
alternative methods focus on determining whether a child can under-
stand if statements are false and on the child‘s ability to communi-
 
389 United States v. Spotted War Bonnet, 933 F.2d 1471, 1474 (8th Cir. 1991) (citing 
United States v. Dorian, 803 F.2d 1439, 1446 (8th Cir. 1986)).  For an in depth discussion, 
see Raeder, supra note 1, at 384-85. 
390 United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554 (1988). 
391 Id.  During the crime, the witness suffered amnesia from a blow to his head.  Id. at 556.  
At the time of the trial, he remembered that he had previously identified the defendant as his 
assailant; however he could not remember seeing his assailant and was unable to recall de-
tails of the assault.  Id. 
392 Id. at 564. 
393 Owens, 484 U.S. at 559 (emphasis added) (quoting Delaware v. Fensterer, 474 U.S. 15, 
20 (1985)). 
394 Thomas D. Lyon, Child Witnesses and the Oath: Empirical Evidence, 73 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1017, 1022 (2000). 
395 Scallen, supra note 381, at 1587 (citing Thomas D. Lyon & Karen J. Saywitz, Qualify-
ing Children to Take the Oath: Materials for Interviewing Professionals (May 2000), avail-
able at http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1008&context=thomaslyon). 
396 Id. (citing Lyon & Saywitz, supra note 395). 
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cate. 
If the lack of testimonial competency of a young child is due 
to the child‘s inability to communicate with the jury, then courts have 
flexibility under Maryland v. Craig397 to utilize alternative methods 
to traditional testimony such as closed circuit televisions or screening 
devices.398  These alternative procedures can improve a child‘s com-
petency level by enhancing the child‘s ability to communicate with 
the jury, and if used effectively, can operate to assure that more child-
ren will testify at trial.399  Although some commentators have ques-
tioned the continued viability of Craig after Crawford, lower federal 
courts have upheld it, finding that Crawford applies only to testi-
monial statements made prior to trial and not to procedures or me-
thods utilized to enhance a child‘s testimony during trial.400 
In cases in which a child is found incompetent to testify or is 
otherwise unavailable at the time of trial, the admissibility of the 
child‘s testimonial statements will depend on whether the defendant 
was afforded a prior opportunity for cross-examination.  A pre-trial 
deposition, which should take place after formal criminal charges are 
filed, can provide the defendant with this opportunity, and assure that 
a child‘s testimonial statements can be admitted at trial.  Furthermore, 
provided that certain requirements are met, a video-taped deposition 
 
397 497 U.S. 836 (1990).  This case addressed the constitutionality of a Maryland statute 
that existed at the time that allowed one-way closed circuit testimony of child witnesses 
upon a showing that testifying in a courtroom would cause the child to suffer ―serious emo-
tional distress such that the child cannot reasonably communicate.‖  Id. at 841 (citing MD. 
CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 9-102(a)(1)(ii)(1989)).  The Court noted that the principal 
concern of the Confrontation Clause is to ―ensure the reliability of the evidence against a 
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an adversary proceed-
ing before the trier of fact.‖  Id. at 845.  The Court found that the Maryland procedure pre-
served all of the elements of the confrontation right except for face-to-face confrontation and 
found that it furthered an important state interest – ―protecting child witnesses from the 
trauma of testifying in [] child abuse case[s] is sufficiently important to justify the use of a 
special procedure that permits a child witness in such cases to testify at trial against a defen-
dant in the absence of face-to-face confrontation with the defendant.‖  Id. at 855. 
398 Raeder, supra note 6, at 1015. 
399 Scallen, supra note 381, at 1592-93.  For a discussion of Maryland v. Craig in a post-
Crawford world, see Raeder, supra note 1, at 386-87.  Professor Raeder‘s recent work con-
tains an in-depth discussion of the various methods of alternative testimony that may be em-
ployed.  Myrna S. Raeder, Distrusting Young Children Who Allege Sexual Abuse: Why Ste-
reotypes Don’t Die and Ways to Facilitate Child Testimony, 16 WIDENER. L. REV. 239, 261-
62 (2010). 
400 Scallen, supra note 381, at 1591-92 (citing United States v. Yates, 438 F.3d 1307, 
1313-14 n.4 (11th Cir. 2006)); see also United States v. Bordeaux, 400 F.3d 548, 553-56 
(8th Cir. 2005). 
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can be admitted at trial in lieu of the child‘s in-court testimony.401  
 
401 18 U.S.C. § 3509 (2006 & Supp. III 2009).  This statute provides comprehensive and 
thoughtful standards to be applied in circumstances involving the remote testimony of a 
child and the use at trial of videotaped depositions at trial. 
(2) Videotaped deposition of child.--(A) In a proceeding involving an al-
leged offense against a child, the attorney for the Government, the 
child‘s attorney, the child‘s parent or legal guardian, or the guardian ad 
litem appointed under subsection (h) may apply for an order that a depo-
sition be taken of the child‘s testimony and that the deposition be record-
ed and preserved on videotape. 
(B) 
(i) Upon timely receipt of an application described in subparagraph (A), 
the court shall make a preliminary finding regarding whether at the time 
of trial the child is likely to be unable to testify in open court in the phys-
ical presence of the defendant, jury, judge, and public for any of the fol-
lowing reasons: 
(I) The child will be unable to testify because of fear. 
(II) There is a substantial likelihood, established by expert tes-
timony, that the child would suffer emotional trauma from tes-
tifying in open court. 
(III) The child suffers a mental or other infirmity. 
(IV) Conduct by defendant or defense counsel causes the child 
to be unable to continue testifying. 
(ii) If the court finds that the child is likely to be unable to testify in open 
court for any of the reasons stated in clause (i), the court shall order that 
the child‘s deposition be taken and preserved by videotape. 
(iii) The trial judge shall preside at the videotape deposition of a child 
and shall rule on all questions as if at trial.  The only other persons who 
may be permitted to be present at the proceeding are— 
(I) the attorney for the Government; 
(II) the attorney for the defendant; 
(III) the child‘s attorney or guardian ad litem appointed under 
subsection (h); 
(IV) persons necessary to operate the videotape equipment; 
(V) subject to clause (iv), the defendant; and 
(VI) other persons whose presence is determined by the court 
to be necessary to the welfare and well-being of the child. 
The defendant shall be afforded the rights applicable to defen-
dants during trial, including the right to an attorney, the right 
to be confronted with the witness against the defendant, and 
the right to cross-examine the child. 
(iv) If the preliminary finding of inability under clause (i) is based on 
evidence that the child is unable to testify in the physical presence of the 
defendant, the court may order that the defendant, including a defendant 
represented pro se, be excluded from the room in which the deposition is 
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Prosecutors should be encouraged to employ these procedures when-
ever it is feasible to do so.  Thus, the use of alternative competency 
assessment tools, modifying the conditions under which young child-
ren testify, will operate to significantly increase the likelihood that 
the testimony of young children will be admissible at trial. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court‘s Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, 
with its shift from a reliability-based approach to the current testi-
monial approach, has made it more difficult for prosecutors to have 
children‘s hearsay statements admitted at trial.  The Court‘s recent 
decision in Bryant will likely add to this difficulty.  First, the decision 
treats domestic violence cases differently from other crimes in terms 
of determining the state of an ongoing emergency.  Second, it shifts 
the focus of the primary purpose analysis to interrogators in instances 
where the declarant operates under a disability.  Third, it suggests 
that statements made to ―state actors‖ can be testimonial.402  As a re-
sult, the Bryant opinion will likely increase the chances that courts 
will find a child‘s out-of-court statements to be testimonial and there-
fore not admissible at trial unless the child testifies. 
However, courts can increase the chances that children will 
testify at trial by adopting alternative competency assessment tools 
and by allowing children to testify under alternative conditions, such 
as through the use of closed-circuit television or through the use of 
pre-trial depositions in which the defendant is afforded an opportuni-
ty for cross-examination.  These tools will assure that children will be 
heard and that their complaints of sexual abuse will be admissible at 
trial under circumstances that recognize the delicate balance that is 
 
conducted.  If the court orders that the defendant be excluded from the 
deposition room, the court shall order that 2-way closed circuit television 
equipment relay the defendant‘s image into the room in which the child 
is testifying, and the child‘s testimony into the room in which the defen-
dant is viewing the proceeding, and that the defendant be provided with 
a means of private, contemporaneous communication with the defen-
dant‘s attorney during the deposition. 
Id. § 3509(b)(2)(B)(i)-(iv); see also Mueller & Kirkpatrick, supra note 237, at 316-17 (citing 
John R. Christiansen, The Testimony of Child Witnesses: Fact, Fantasy, and the Influence of 
Pretrial Interviews, 62 WASH. L. REV. 705, 706 (1987)); Note, The Testimony of Child Vic-
tims in Sex Abuse Prosecutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 808 
(1985). 
402 Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155. 
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required to protect the compelling, yet competing, interests at stake: 
the need to prosecute offenders of these horrific crimes and the need 
to honor the mandate of the Confrontation Clause. 
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